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TERRORIZING JUSTICE: AN ARGUMENT
THAT PLEA BARGAINS STRUCK UNDER
THE THREAT OF "ENEMY COMBATANT"
DETENTION VIOLATE THE RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS
Abstract: As part of the War on Terror, the President has detained cer-
tain individuals as "enemy combatants"—a form of military detention
that is preventive, non-criminal, and of indefinite duration. Some ter-
rorism defendants appear to have pled guilty to criminal charges in or-
der to avoid being detained as enemy combatants. This Note argues
that plea bargains induced by threats of enemy combatant detention do
not arise from the normal give-and-take of plea bargaining, create seri-
ous public policy concerns, and serve no societal interests that could
not be served equally well by other means. It therefore concludes that
the courts should hold such plea bargains per se unenforceable under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
He took a cigarette out of the case and forced it into Rubashov's mouth
without letting go his coat button. 'You're behaving like an infant. Like a
romantic infant,' he added. 'Now we are going to concoct a nice little con-
fession and that will be all for today.'
. . . Yt is not in my interest to lay you open to mental shocks. All that
only drives you further into your moral exaltation. I need you sober and
logical. My only interest is that you should calmly think your case to a con-
clusion. For when you have thought the whole thing to a conclusion—then,
and only then, will you capitulate.'
—Arthur Koestler'
In Arthur Koestler's Cold War-era novel Darkness at Noon, set dur-
ing the Soviet show trials of the 1930s, the interrogator poses a choice
to the protagonist Rubashov: either insist on his innocence and be
summarily sentenced to death in a secret administrative trial, or con-
1 ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 104, 356 (Daphne Hardy trails., Folio Soc'y
1980) (1940).
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fess at a public trial and gain the interrogator's assistance in reducing
his sentence.2
Since the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S.
President George W. Bush has claimed the authority to designate in-
dividuals as "enemy combatants" and detain them under military
authority indefinitely, without charges and without a criminal trial.'
Enemy combatant detention is a form of preventive military deten-
tion that carries minimal due process guarantees (for example, the
government need not accuse the detainee of any particular wrongful
acts, and the detainee bears the burden of disproving the govern-
ment's factual allegations in any challenge to the detention). 4 It also
involves confinement in unusually restrictive conditions for an uncer-
tain, potentially lifelong, duration. 5 Many commentators have argued
2 Id. at 106.
3
 Brief for the Respondents at 25-27, liamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No.
03-6696); see Brief for the Petitioners at 38, Rumsfeld v. Padilla (Padilla I), 542 U.S. 426
(2004) (No. 03-1027). No all-encompassing definition for the term "enemy combatant"
exists because the government has provided only specific examples of people who could
be designated enemy combatants, without providing any examples of people who could
not be designated enemy combatants. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355
Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005). In Hamdi u Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court established
that the term encompasses any person, whether a U.S. citizen or a foreign national, who
engages in foreign armed conflict against the United States or directly assists enemy forces
engaging in such hostilities. See 542 U.S. at 516-17; see also Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355
F. Stipp. 2d at 475. The government also asserts that the term may encompass some indi-
viduals who have neither committed any belligerent act against U.S. forces nor directly
assisted such acts, such as a little old lady who writes checks to what she believes is a charity
but is actually an Al Qaeda front, an English teacher who provides language instruction to
the son of an Al Qaeda member, and a journalist who refuses to disclose the location of
Osama bin Laden. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Stipp. 2d at 475. In addition, the gov-
ernment asserts that the locus of capture is irrelevant; a person may be designated an en-
emy combatant regardless of whether that person is on U.S. soil or abroad. See Brief for the
Petitioners, supra, at 30; see also Padilla v. Hanft (Padilla II), 423 F.3d 386, 392 (4th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, No. 05-533, 2006 WL 845383 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2006). The Supreme Court
has twice declined to rule on the question of whether a U.S. citizen captured in the United
States may be designated an enemy combatant, and has not yet been confronted with a
case in which a foreign national captured in the United States may be designated an en-
emy combatant. See Padilla v. Ilanft (Padilla V), No. 05-533, 2006 WL 845383, at *2 (U.S.
Apr. 3, 2006) (denying certiorari); Padilla I, 542 U.S. at 430 (reversing the court on juris-
dictional grounds); see also Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Stipp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005) (holding as
proper the detention as an enemy combatant of a foreign national captured in the United
States).
4 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34, 538 (describing the limited due process guarantees for
enemy combatants).
5 See Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Stipp. 2d at 465 (noting that because the gov-
ernment has conceded that the War on Terror could last for several generations, enemy
combatant detention may well amount to a life sentence); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS:
DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 41
2006]	 Plea Bargaining Under the Threat of Enemy Combatant Detention	 583
that this asserted power to designate individuals as enemy combatants
violates the individuals' due process rights, undermines fundamental
principles of democratic governance, and borrows from the worst tra-
ditions of wartime repression in America and abroad. 6 Justice Stevens
opined, in dissent to one pro-government enemy combatant decision,
that this kind of executive branch detention is "the hallmark of the
Star Chamber." Nevertheless, few scholarly articles have addressed
the harms caused by allowing the military, preventive-detention im-
peratives of enemy combatant detention to contaminate the criminal
justice system. 5
(2003) (asserting that society will almost certainly cure both cancer and the common cold
before it can stop terrorism).
See, e.g., COLE, supra note 5, at 39-46; Erwin Chetnerinsky, Detainees, 68 ALB. L REV.
1119, 1122-26 (2005); Jesselyn A. Radack, You Say Defendant, I Say Combatant: Opportunistic
Treatment of Terrorism Suspects Held in the United States and the Need for Due Process, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE. 525, 533-36 (2005).
7 Padilla I, 542 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court's holding that
the enemy combatant's challenge to his detention should be dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds). The Court of Star Chamber was a special court convened by the King of Eng-
land that was known for its secrecy and disregard for individual rights, and its name is of-
ten invoked as a symbol of abuse of power. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821
(1975) (describing the Star Chamber as a centuries-old symbol of disregard! for basic
rights); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 202-03 (1958) (Black,,)., dissenting) (de-
scribing the Star Chamber as art "odious instrument of tyranny" whose arbitrary proce-
dures and gross excesses inspired many of the safeguards included in the U.S. Constitu-
tion); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (describing the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination as being aimed at preventing a recurrence of the
abuses of the Spanish Inquisition and the Star Chamber); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-
70 (1948) (describing the Star Chamber as a symbol of menace to liberty that is in part re-
sponsible for the Anglo-American distrust for secret trials).
8 See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme. Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 94-111 (2005) (arguing that in times of war, including the War
on Terror, wartime conditions affect the Supreme Court's disposition of ordinary civil
rights and civil liberties cases more than they affect the disposition of cases directly related
to war); Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, Institutional Equity,
and Procedure After September 11, 84 11.U. L. REV. 383, 431-36 (2004) (criticizing the com-
promise that the district court struck in United States v, Moussamti, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480
(E.1). Va. 2003) between the defendant's interest in gaining access to an Al Qaeda witness
in U.S. custody, and the national security interest in denying such access); Radack, supra
note 6, at 541-42 (arguing that the "revolving door" between military detention and civil-
ian prosecutions undermines the legitimacy of both systems); Andrew T. Jackola, Com-
ment, A Second Bite at the Apple. How the Governmenes Use of the Doctrine of Enemy Combatants
in the Case of Zacarias Moussaoui Threatens to Upset the Future of the. Criminal Justice System, 27
HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 125-31 (2004) (arguing that the possibility that a terrorism defen-
dant could be tried for the same offense by both the criminal justice system and a military
tribunal implicates double jeopardy concerns).
Although some scholars have mentioned the potential influence of enemy combatant
threats on plea bargaining, they have not analyzed it in great detail. See Susan M. Akram &
Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/I1 Policies Involving
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When a prosecutor uses the threat of enemy combatant deten-
tion as leverage in a criminal case, the threat creates extraordinary
pressure to plead guilty, not unlike the pressure on Rubashov to Ca-
pitulate. 9
 A pair of terrorism prosecutions illustrates how this pressure
operates.'° In March 2003, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the
Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 609, 683 (2005) (noting that in some cases, the government appeared to be
using the threat of enemy combatant detention to obtain guilty pleas); Margulies, supra, at
424 (noting that threats of enemy combatant detention may have an in ter-mem effect on
defendants considering whether or not to plead guilty); kadack, supra note 6, at 541 (not-
ing the possibility that the government uses the threat of enemy combatant detention to
coerce terrorism defendants into pleading guilty); Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages
offustice in the War Against Terror, 109 PENN Sr. L REV. 967, 997 (2005) (noting that threats
of enemy combatant detention or deportation may unduly influence criminal defendants'
decisions to plead guilty).
A handful of writings targeted at lay audiences have gone into greater detail than schol-
arly publications. See Harvey A. Silverglate & Carl Takei, Crossing the Threshold: While We're All
Fretting over the Patriot Act, John Ashcroft's Justice Department Is After Much Bigger Game, THE Bos-
TON PHOENIX, Mar. 5, 2004, at 18, available at http://wwwbostonphoenix.com/threshold/
03650087.asp (arguing that the threat of enemy combatant detention during plea bargaining
turns guilty pleas into a Soviet-style masquerade); KAREN J. GREENBERG, CTR. ON LAW & SEC.,
N.Y. UNIV. SCH. or LAW, THE COURTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 1-2 (2005), http://www.
lawnyu.edu/centers/lawsecurity/publications/documents/TerroristTrialReportCardinsert .
pdf (arguing that threats of enemy combatant detention during plea bargaining are a form
of extralegal coercion).
9 See KOESTLER, supra note 1, at 106; see also Roach & Trotter, supra note 8, at 997 (not-
ing in passing the pressure 10 plead guilty presented by the threat of enemy combatant
detention).
1 ° See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. As used in this Note, the terms "terror-
ism defendant" and "terrorism prosecution" mean, respectively, any criminal defendant
who is the subject of what the Justice Department describes as a "terrorism investigation"
and any prosecution arising front such an investigation. See Dan Eggert & Julie Tate, U.S.
Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges, Statistics Often Count Lesser Crimes,
WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at Al. The terms are overinclusive in that they include many
cases in which the Justice Department eventually concluded that the defendant had no
actual ties to terrorism or charged the defendant with minor crimes that appear unrelated
to terrorism, such as credit card fraud, the making of false statements to federal officials,
immigration violations, and even the defrauding of the federal food stamp program. See id.
(concluding that of the Justice Department's 361 terrorism investigations, only 142 in-
volved public allegations of ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, and only 39 terror-
ism defendants were convicted of crimes directly related to terrorism or national security);
see also Jerry Markon, The Terrorism Case That Wasn't—and Still Is, WASH. POST, June 12,
2005, at A19; Jerry Markon, Post-9/11 Probe Revived Stolen Cereal Incident, WAsti. POST, June
12, 2005, at Al9; Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool, WASH. POST,
June 13, 2005, at Al. Nevertheless, the Justice Department's designations remain useful for
the purposes of this Note because the designations include all criminal investigations where
the Department suspected—at least initially—that the defendant had ties to terrorist organi-
zations or terrorist acts. See Egger] & Tate, supra, at Al. In other words, the Justice Depart-
ment's terrorism investigations encompass the entire universe of cases in which prosecutors
could plausibly threaten the defendant with enemy combatant detention. See id.
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"FBI") approached Lyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Kash-
mir, to investigate his possible links to terrorist organizations." After
Faris agreed to cooperate, the agents took him to Quantico, Virginia,
where, according to the attorney representing Faris on appeal, the
FBI kept Faris under guard and subjected him to almost daily interro-
gations. 12 After more than two weeks, Faris met for the first time with
his court-appointed defense counsel." According to press accounts
and Faris's attorney, the FBI put intense pressure on Faris to plead
guilty to providing material support to terrorism; within four days of
being appointed, Faris's attorney advised him that if he did not plead
guilty, the Defense Department would designate him an enemy com-
batant and ship him to Guantanamo Bay." Fads chose to accept the
plea bargain and was sentenced to twenty years in prison."
During the same year, Qatari citizen All Sale!' Kahlah al-Marri
was under indictment for terrorism-related financial fraud and lying
to the FBI about his phone calls to the Middle Fast," Al-Marri in-
tended to proceed to trial, but one month before the scheduled trial
date, President Bush declared him an enemy combatant. 17 The gov-
" Brief of Appellant at 4, United States v. Fads, 388 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
4865) [hereinafter Fads Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Appellate Brief]; see Faris, 388 F.3d at
454 (denying Faris's motion to withdraw his guilty plea), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 125 S. Ct. 1637 (mem.), affd on remand, 162 F. App'x 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpub-
lished) (per curiam); see also Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Cites Al Qaeda in Plot to Destroy Brooklyn
Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, '2003, at Al.
12 Transcript of Motions and Sentencing Hearing at 18, 42, Faris, No. 03-189-A (E.D.
Va. Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Faris Oct. 28, 2003 Hearing Transcript]; Faris Withdrawal
of Guilty Plea Appellate Brief, supra note 11, at 4-5. According to prosecutors, Fads was
eager to provide assistance, telling FBI agents that he wanted to become an "agent for the
FBI" and help locate Al Qaeda members in Pakistan. Faris Oct. 28, 2003 Hearing Tran-
script, supra, at 18.
16 Faris Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Appellate Brief, supra note 11, at 5; Faris Oct. 28,
2003 Hearing Transcript, supra note 12, at 7. Faris later filed a motion to vacate his convic-
tion, alleging that his original attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Memo-
randum of Law in Support of Motion to Vacate Conviction Under § 2255, at 2, Faris, No.
05-CR-189 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Faris 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Memorandum].
14 Faris Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Appellate Brief, supra note 11, at 5; R. Jeffrey Smith
and Amy DePaul, Al Qaeda 'Same [lad Law Profile: Home in Heartland Afforded Ideal Cover,
WASFI. POST, June 21, 2003, at A10; see also Faris, 388 F.3d at 457; Lichtblau, supra note 11,
at Al2.
15 Eric Lichtblau, Thicker Sentenced to 20 Years in Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2003, at A23.
16 Susan Schmidt, Qatari Man Designated an Enemy Combatant, WASH. PosT, June 24,
2003, at Al.
17 id. Because the government did not make public the specific reasons for its decision
to designate al-Marri au enemy combatant, it is not entirely clear whether al-Marri's refusal
to plead guilty was a factor in that decision. See Al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Stipp. 2d 1003, 1009
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ernment still holds aI-Marri as an enemy combatant." The two cases,
resolved within days of each other, sent a clear message to terrorism
defendants: either plead guilty and accept a fixed sentence from the
Justice Department, or refuse to cooperate and be thrown into the
legal black hole of enemy combatant detention.°
This Note argues that in the context of the War on Terror, the
threat of extrajudicial enemy combatant detention—an indefinite,
preventive, and non-criminal military detention—puts unique and
intolerable pressure on the plea bargaining process. 2° Forcing defen-
dants to choose between enemy combatant detention and a guilty
plea is far more coercive than making them choose between a trial,
with its attendant risk of a conviction on more serious charges, and a
guilty plea. 2' In addition, plea bargains induced by threats of enemy
combatant detention (hereinafter "enemy combatant threat bar-
gains") let military imperatives, rather than criminal justice impera-
tives, drive the plea bargaining process. 22 Enforcing such bargains
corrodes both the integrity of the criminal justice system and the rule
of law." This Note therefore concludes that the courts should hold
enemy combatant threat bargains per se unenforceable under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 24
(C.D. Ill. 2003), affd, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809 (2004). Al-Marri's
attorney believes, however, that the designation was a response to the "powerful legal chal-
lenges" that al-Marri made in his criminal case. Schmidt, supra note 16, at AL
18
 See Al-Afarri, 378 F. Stipp. 2d at 680-82 (denying al-Marri's motion for summary
judgment on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
19 See Eric Lichtblau, Wide Impact from Enemy Combatant Detention Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2003, at A14 (reporting that "a senior F.B.I. official said today that the Marri deci-
sion held clear implications for other terrorism suspects. 'If I were in their shoes, I'd take a
message from this,' the official said").
2° See infra notes 183-282 and accompanying text.
21
 See infra notes 183-282 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 246-255 and accompanying text. The term "enemy combatant threat
bargains" is the author's own.
2°
 See infra notes 246-255 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 256-282 and accompanying text. Terrorism prosecutions are almost
always a matter of federal criminal enforcement, and enemy combatant detention is itself
an exercise of federal power. See Ilamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-18 (describing the President's
power to detain enemy combatants as being incident to waging war); Attorney General
Alberto R. Gonzalez, Remarks to Department of Justice Employees (Feb. 4, 2005), (tran-
script available at http://wmcjustice.goviopa/pr/2005/February/05_ag045.htm)
 (stat-
ing, upon his confirmation as Attorney General, that protecting the United States from
terrorism is the Justice Department's "top priority"). For that reason, this Note focuses on
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which curtails federal power, and not on
the Fourteenth Amendment, which curtails the power of the states. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Part I of this Note introduces the role of plea bargains in the U.S.
criminal justice system and examines the standards for the enforce-
ability of plea bargains in traditional criminal justice contexts. 25 It also
describes the related category of release-dismissal agreements, which
courts have been more hesitant to enforce. 26 Part II describes the en-
emy combatant detention power and its relevance to criminal prose-
cutions in the War on Terror. 27 Part III contends that enemy combat-
ant threat bargains do not arise from the normal give-and-take of plea
bargaining, create serious public policy concerns, and serve no socie-
tal interests that could not be served equally well by other means. 28 It
therefore concludes that the courts should hold enemy combatant
threat bargains per se unenforceable under the Due Process Clause.29
I. Ti n ENFORCEABILITY OF PLEA BARGAINS IN TRADITIONAL
CRIMINAL. CONTEXTS
A. Plea Bargains Generally
Plea bargaining is the process by which a prosecutor and a crimi-
nal defendant negotiate an agreement, where the defendant pleads
guilty to a lesser offense or to a particular charge in exchange for
some concession by the prosecutor, such as a more lenient sentence
or a dismissal of other charges." In 1971, in Sanlobello v. New York, the
U.S. Supreme Court succinctly summarized why plea bargaining is an
essential feature of the U.S. criminal justice system: it leads to prompt
and largely final disposition of most criminal cases, it avoids much of
the corrosive impact of a defendant's enforced idleness during pre-
trial confinement, it protects the public from the chance that a de-
fendant would commit new crimes while on pretrial release, and, by
25 See infra notes 30-86 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
27 See info notes 109-182 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 183-255 and accompanying text.
2° See info notes 256-282 and accompanying text.
so HEActes LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (8th ed. 2004). Although it now occupies a central
place in the criminal justice system, plea bargaining did not become a dominant method
of resolving criminal cases until the late nineteenth century, and the Supreme Court did
not explicitly approve of the practice until the latter half of the twentieth century. See Al-
bert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 921-26 (1994); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triu mph, 109 YAI.E
L.J. 857,864-69 (2000).
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shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances the
rehabilitative prospects of guilty defendants. 31
Without the prompt disposition of cases through plea bargain-
ing, unresolved cases would flood the criminal justice system." In
2003, for example, only 4% of the 85,106 federal criminal defendants
exercised their right to a trial, and guilty pleas constituted nearly 96%
of the 75,805 convictions that year. 33 Yet as indispensable as plea bar-
gaining is to the judicial system, it also carries significant potential for
abuse.34
 By pleading guilty to a crime, the defendant relieves the
prosecution of the burden of proving its case, and waives his or her
privilege against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, right to con-
front his or her accusers, and most evidentiary objections. 35
 In 1968,
in Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court pointedly recognized this
potential for abuse, observing that a plea bargain obtained by means
of prosecutorial coercion or threats, or through the defendant's igno-
rance, fear, or lack of comprehension, can serve as "a perfect cover-up
of unconstitutionality." 36 In an effort to guard against such abuses
31
 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) (holding that prosecutors must keep the promises they
make to defendants in plea bargains).
32 Id. at 260 (noting that if every criminal charge resulted in a jury trial, federal and
state governments would have a great need for more judges and court facilities).
97
	 OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM of FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATisTics, 2003, at 59, 62 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/cljs03.pdf.
34 See: joint W Keker, The Advent of the 'Vanishing Trial: Why Trials Matter, CHAMPION,
Sept.—Oct. 2005, at 32-35 (arguing that the widespread use of plea bargains interferes with
public scrutiny of the judicial system and deprives the defense bar of any way of keeping
overzealous prosecutors in check).
33
 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (reversing the conviction of a
criminal defendant because the record did not clearly establish that his guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary); see McMarm v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (holding
that, where a defendant pled guilty based on counsel's incorrect conclusion that a prior
coerced confession would be admissible at trial, the defendant assumed the risk that his
attorney was mistaken on either the facts or the law, as long as the attorney was reasonably
competent and made those mistakes in good faith).
36 395 U.S. at 243. Indeed, although the Supreme Court seldom finds unequal bar-
gaining power in plea negotiations, many scholars and lower courts have expressed con-
cerns about the relative bargaining power of the prosecutor and the defendant. Compare
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (describing the "give-and-take" of plea
negotiation as a situation in which the prosecutor and the defendant possess relatively
equal bargaining power) (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1969)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)), with United States v. Mezzanauo, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that defendants are generally in no position to challenge
the standard form waivers that many prosecutors require as a condition of entering into
plea negotiations), United States v. Green, 346 F. Stipp. 2d 259, 265-76 (D. Mass. 2004)
(observing that various structural elements of plea bargaining, and sentencing guidelines
in particular, place enormous power in the hands of federal prosecutors and give rise to a
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while preserving the finality of most plea bargains, the Supreme
Court requires any guilty plea to be made voluntarily and intelli-
gently.37 Yet the question remains: what kinds of coercion or unequal
bargaining power can render a plea involuntary? 38
B. Statutory Structures That Improperly Encourage Guilty Pleas and Their
Effect on Voluntariness
When a criminal statute mandates a lesser punishment for those
who plead guilty but allows a heavier punishment for those found
guilty at trial, the imposition of the heavy punishment may be uncon-
stitutional. 39 In 1967, in United Slates v. Jackson, the Supreme Court
held unenforceable the death penalty clause of the Federal Kidnap-
ping Act, a criminal statute, because the statute exposed the defendant
to a possible death sentence after a jury trial but only to a potential
life sentence after a guilty plea. 4° After being indicted under this stat-
ute, Jackson and his co-defendants moved to dismiss the indictment,
arguing that the death-by-jury, life-by-plea structure of the statute
impermissibly burdened their Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial
and their Fifth Amendment due process rights:" In response, the
government asserted that because this structure served Congress's
interest in avoiding the harshness of a mandatory death penalty for all
capital convictions, the statute's incidental effect on the defendants'
decision making was unimportant.42
 The Supreme Court rejected the
system that is heavily rigged against the accused citizen), rev'd sub nom. United States v.
Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2005), Lynn Fan t & Ronk Walker, Reflections on a Hobson's
Choke: Appellate Waivers and Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED, SENI"G REP. 60, 61 (1998) (argu-
ing that because of both sentencing guidelines and severe mandatory minimum sentences,
prosecutors have a much stronger bargaining position than defendants do during plea
negotiations), and John H. Langbcin, Thrture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Ctn. L. Rev. 3, 12—
1 4 (1978) (arguing that modern plea bargaining coerces the accused to plead in much the
same way as the medieval judiciary's use of torture coerced the accused to confess).
37 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (holding that where the de-
fendant pled guilty voluntarily and intelligently, his plea agreement was enforceable even
through he steadfastly insisted that he was innocent during his plea colloquy); Boykin, 395 U.S.
at 242 (reversing the defendant's conviction because the record did not establish that his
guilty plea was both voluntary and intelligent). In federal courts, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure II requires district court judges to conduct a colloquy that probes the voluntari-
ness, intelligence, and factual basis for the defendant's plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
38 See, e.g., Alford, 400 U.S. at 31; Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242.
39 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1967).
48 Id,
41 Id. at 571. After the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the in-
dictments, the government appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Id. at 571-72.
42
 Id. at 582.
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death or hope of leniency gripped him so tightly that, with the assis-
tance of counsel, he did not or could not choose rationally between
risking a trial or pleading guilty. 52 The Court embraced this broad
voluntariness standard because it could not distinguish Brady's pre-
dicament from that of any other defendant who feared receiving a
greater penalty at trial." And if a defendant's fear of receiving a
greater penally at trial could, without more, invalidate a guilty plea,
then no plea bargain could survive attack. 54 Such a result would be
against public policy, the Court reasoned, because it would eliminate
the mutual benefits that plea bargaining creates for the state and the
defendant: the state saves scarce judicial resources and obtains
prompt punishment, and the defendant limits his exposure and avoids
the burdens of a tria1.55 Thus, the Court held that Brady voluntarily
entered his guilty plea. 56 Other decisions, including two decided on
the same day as Brady, made clear that Brady's voluntariness standard
applied to all plea bargains struck under similar death-by-jury, life-by-
plea statutes. 57
52 M. The Court in Brady drew a sharP distinction between defendants pleading guilty
without the assistance of counsel and defendants pleading guilty while represented by
counsel. See id. at 753-55. Pleas without counsel, however, are beyond the scope of this
Note because indigent persons charged with criminal offenses have the right to an ap-
pointed attorney. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that
legal counsel must be made available to criminal defendants who cannot retain counsel).
Although one heavily publicized terrorism defendant. chose to proceed pro se and then
unexpectedly chose to plead guilty, the author is not aware of any terrorism defendants
who engaged in plea bargaining without the assistance of counsel. See United States v.
Moussaoui, No. 0ICR455 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2005) (order denying a sealed motion by de-
fendant Zacarias Moussaoui's court-appointed counsel to rescind Moussaoui's unrepre-
sented guilty plea); Motion by Zacarias Moussaoui to Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel
and Proceed Pro Se, Moussaoui, No. 0 ICR455 (stating, in a motion handwritten by the
defendant in his prison cell, that the defendant rejects the "imposition" of' his court-
appointed lawyers and wishes to proceed pro se).
53 Brady, 397 U.S. at 751-52. In a related decision, justice Brennan criticized the Brady
standard as apparently requiring the defendant's mental state to border on temporary
insanity to render the guilty plea involuntary. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 800
ri.2 (1970) (Brennan, j., dissenting).
51 Brady, 397 U.S. at 753.
55
 Id. at 752-53.
56 Id. at 756-77.
57 See Parker, 397 U.S. at 798; Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771, In Parker v. North Carolina, the
Court refused to grant relief to a defendant who pled guilty based on a combination of
incorrect legal advice and death-by :jury, life-by-plea pressures. Parker, 397 U.S. at 797-98.
Parker argued that the Court should hold his plea involuntary because he was convicted
under a statutory framework essentially identical to that held unconstitutional in Jackson.
Id. at 794. Justice Brennan, joined by justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented! from the
Court's rejection of this argument, contending that the majority's decision undermined
the rationale of Jackson by making it essentially impossible for defendants to rescind a
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In 1978, in Corbitt v. New Jersey, the Court limited the reach of
Jackson in non-capital cases, refusing to extend Jackson principles to a
statute that involved a potential life sentence rather than the death
penalty and that allowed, but did not mandate, a lighter sentence for
guilty pleas.58 New jersey prosecutors charged defendant Corbitt with
first-degree murder under a New Jersey statute that imposed manda-
tory life imprisonment for first-degree murder jury convictions, but
gave judges discretion over the penalty for those pleading nolo con-
tendere.59 Corbitt pled not guilty, the jury convicted him at trial, and
he received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, which he
subsequently challenged. 6° The Court distinguished Jackson because
the pressures on Corbitt to forgo trial did not rise to the same magni-
tude as the pressures in Jackson.61 First, Corbitt did not face the
unique severity and irrevocability of the death penalty. 62 Second, be-
cause life imprisonment remained within the judge's sentencing dis-
cretion after accepting Corbitt's plea, pleading nolo contendere did
not reduce Corbitt's sentencing exposurc. 68 Unconvinced that the
New Jersey statute exerted unconstitutionally powerful coercion for
innocent defendants to plead nolo contendere, the Court affirmed
Corbitt's sentence s4 Thus, by the late 1970s, the Court had defined
"voluntariness" in a way that made it very difficult for defendants to
invalidate plea bargains even when Jackson principles applied, and it
had limited Jackson principles to situations in which a guilty plea nec-
guilty plea based on unconstitutional coercion. Id. at 799-800 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan argued that plea bargains obtained through unconstitutional pressures
give rise to a clear danger that innocent people would plead guilty, and so should be sub-
jected to greater scrutiny than other plea bargains. See id. at 807-10 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Also on the same day, in McMann u Richardson, the Court explicitly held that a de-
fendant cannot overturn an otherwise valid guilty plea by proof that the plea was
motivated by a prior coerced confession. 397 U.S. at 771. Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tices Douglas and Marshall, dissented, arguing that the majority elevated form over sub-
stance in what he characterized as a rankly unfair effort to preserve the sanctity of virtually
all plea bargains. Id. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In 1971, in Atkinson a North Carolina,
the Court reaffirmed that Jackson was still good law—that its recent decisions had limited
rather than overruled it. Atkinson v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948, 948 (1971) (mew.).
Without any opinion beyond a citation to Jackson, the Court reversed a death sentence
imposed by North Carolina's death-by-jury, life-by-plea capital statute. Id. at 948 (citing
generally Jackson, 390 U.S. 570).
58 439 U.S. 212, 217 (1978).
59 Id. at 215-16.
Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 216.
61 Id. at 217; see also Jackson, 397 U.S. at 583.
62 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 217.
65
 H. at 217.
64 Id. at 225.
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essarily prevented the court from imposing an unusually severe
maximum punishmen t.65
C. Proper and Improper Prosecutorial Threats in Plea Bargaining
The Court's reasoning in Jackson opened the door for defendants
to argue that prosecutorial threats to punish defendants more harshly
for exercising their right to a jury trial would, like the statutory struc-
ture at issue in Jackson, he constitutionally suspect because such threats
exert improper pressure on the defendant to plead guilty. 66 In Jackson,
the Court stated in dicta that if the statutory scheme had served no
other purpose than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who exercise them, then it would clearly violate the
defendant's right to due process. 67 This raised the question of whether
a prosecutorial strategy that chilled defendants' assertion of their right
to a jury trial by penalizing those who exercised that right would be
similarly unconstitutional. 68
Over the next eight years, the Supreme Court reserved that
specific question but struck down efforts of judges and prosecutors to
chill the right of defendants to appea1. 69 In -1969, in North Carolina v.
Pearce, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a trial court's pun-
ishment of defendants for appealing their original convictions by im-
posing heavier sentences on retrial." Drawing an analogy to Jackson,
the Court held that such vindictive resentencing is unconstitutional
because it chills the exercise of a basic due process right—the right to
appeal. 7 ' In 1974, in Blackledge v. Perry, the Court extended Pearce to
prosecutorial strategies that chilled the defendant's right to appeal. 72
After the Perry defendant appealed a misdemeanor conviction, the
prosecutor reindicted him for the same conduct, but this time
65 Sir id. at 217; Parker, 397 U.S. at 795; Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771; Brady, 397 U.S. at
750.
See. lackson, 397 U.S. at 583.
67 Id. at 581.
e See id.
n See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974); Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 n.8; North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969). In 1970, in Brady, the Court reserved the
question, expressly stating that its holding (refusing to find coercion where the defendant
pled guilty out of fear of the death penalty) did not cover situations in which the prosecu-
tor or the judge "deliberately emhloyledJ their charging and sentencing powers to induce
a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty." 397 U.S. at 751 ti.8.
70 395 U.S. at 723.
71 Id. at 724.
72 417 U.S. at 25.
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charged the defendant with a felony." The defendant pled guilty to
the new indictment and then filed a habeas corpus petition arguing
that the felony indictment deprived him of due process of law. 74 The
Court declined to enforce the guilty plea because the new indictment
unconstitutionally created a fear of prosecutorial vindictiveness."
Significantly, the Court held that the defendant did not have to estab-
lish that the prosecutor actually had a retaliatory motive; what mat-
tered was that the increase from a misdemeanor to a felony indict-
ment gave rise to a fear of vindictiveness, chilling all but the hardiest
of defendants from exercising their right to appeal."
In 1977, however, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court held that a
prosecutor's threat during plea negotiations to indict the defendant
on a more serious charge if he refused to plead guilty was a permissi-
ble bargaining tactic." In Hayes, the prosecutor first indicted Hayes
on a charge punishable by two to ten years in prison.'" During plea
negotiations, the prosecutor offered Hayes a sentence of five years if
he pled guilty, but warned Hayes that if he did not plead guilty, the
prosecutor would seek a superseding indictment under a different
statute—one that would subject Hayes, if convicted, to mandatory life
imprisonment." Hayes refused the offer, and the prosecutor indicted
him under the life imprisonment statute. 80 In addressing Hayes's
claim of a violation of due process, the Court distinguished Pearce and
73 Id. at 23. At the time, North Carolina law provided for two different tiers of trial
courts, the District Court and the Superior Court. Id. at 22. The District Court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction for the trial of misdemeanors, but a person convicted in the District Court
decisions had the right to a trial de novo in the Superior Court. Id. If the defendant took
such an appeal, then the prior conviction would be annulled and the prosecution would
begin with a clean slate in the Superior Court. Id. Here, Perry was convicted of a misde-
meanor in the District Court and filed a notice of appeal for trial de novo in the Superior
Court. Id. at 23. After the notice of appeal but before the new trial, the prosecutor indicted
Perry for a felony arising from the same conduct for which Perry had been tried in the
District Court. Id.
74 Id. at 21. The defendant also raised a double jeopardy claim, but the Court did not
address this because his due process claim was dispositive. Id. at 25.
75 Id. at 27-28.
76 Id. at 28.
77
 434 U.S. at 365.
7B Id. at 358.
79 Id. at 358-59. As justice Powell noted in dissent, the prosecutor's offer of a five-year
sentence was hardly generous for the original offense charged—uttering one forged check
in the amount of $88.30. Id. at 369 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Sa Id. at 359. Both parties stipulated that the prosecutor possessed sufficient evidence
to support the superseding indictment at the time of his threat, and that the prosecutor
sought the superseding indictment only because of Hayes's refusal to plead guilty to the
original charge. Id.
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Perry because those cases dealt with state retaliation against defen-
dants who chose to appeal their convictions, rather than state pres-
sure to plead guilty during the "normal give-and-take negotiation" of
plea bargaining. 8 ' In the give-and-take of plea bargaining, the Court
held, a prosecutor's threats of new or heavier charges carry no ele-
ment of improper punishment or retaliation as long as the defendant
is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer. 82 The prosecutor has
a legitimate interest at the bargaining table to persuade the defendant
to waive his right to a trial and has broad discretion to decide what
charges to file. 83 The fact that the prosecutor openly presented the
defendant. with a choice between forgoing trial or facing legitimate
but more serious charges at trial did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 84 Thus, under Pearce and Perry,
a plea bargain may be unenforceable if it chills the exercise of a fun-
damental right, such as the right to appeal errors of fact or law. 83 But
under Hayes, threats that form part of the normal give-and-take of
plea bargaining, such as threats to file new criminal charges, are per-
missible—even though they tend to chill the defendant from exercis-
ing the right to a jury trial. 85
D. Judicial Hesitation to Enforce Release-Dismissal Agreements
Hayes suggests that prosecutorial threats regarding the criminal
justice consequences of refusing a plea bargain are almost always a
permissible part of the normal give-and-take of plea bargaining. 87 But
as the example of release-dismissal agreements illustrates, threats un-
related to criminal justice objectives are not part of the normal give-
and-take of plea bargaining. 88 A release-dismissal agreement is an ar-
rangement whereby a prosecutor agrees to dismiss pending criminal
RI Id. at 362-63.
52 Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363.
" Id. at 364-65.
" Id.
" See Perry, 417 U.S. at 28-29; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723.
" See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65.
Ar See id.; Porker, 397 U.S. at 800 & n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the major-
ity's opinion ,as never allowing the unconstitutional pressure identified in Jackson to vitiate
a guilty plea except in highly unrealistic hypothetical situations, and opining that the ma-
jority apparently requires the defendant's mental state to border on temporary insanity for
his or her guilty plea to be involuntary).
See'rown of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,389-94 (1987) (5-4 decision) (holding
that release-dismissal agreements arc not automatically void as against public policy).
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charges against a person, in exchange for that person agreeing not to
sue public officials for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights. 89
Although release-dismissal agreements appear superficially simi-
lar to normal, purely criminal plea bargains, a different standard gov-
erns their enforceability. 8° For many years, courts viewed release-
dismissal agreements with great suspicion, sometimes holding all such
agreements void as against public policy. 9 ' In 1968, for example, in
Dixon v. District of Columbia, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit expressed concerns that release-dismissal agreements suppress le-
gitimate complaints against police misconduct and tempt prosecutors
to trump up charges; the court not only refused to enforce any re-
lease-dismissal agreements, but it also barred prosecutors from filing
new charges against a defendant after he breached such an agree-
ment.92 In 1970, in MacDonald v. Musick, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit went further, characterizing a prosecutor's decision
to seek a release-dismissal agreement as a form of extortion that also
violated state attorney ethics rules 93
In 1987, in Town of Newton v. Rumery, the Supreme Court set to rest
some of the ethical and enforceability questions surrounding release-
dismissal agreements. 94 The Court held, by a 540-4 margin, both that a
89 See id. at 389-94.
9° See id.
91 See Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 68-71 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that an
agreement to release civil rights claims against public officials in exchange for dismissal of
criminal charges is per se void as against public policy), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); Boyd v.
Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that release-dismissal agreements arise
from inherently coercive circumstances and are invalid as against public policy in all but
the rarest of circumstances); MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 375-76 (9th Or. 1970)
(holding that a prosecutor cannot condition voluntary dismissal of a criminal charge upon
a stipulation by time defendant that is designed to forestall the defendant's civil suit against
the police, because such conduct is unethical and a form of extortion); Dixon v. District of
Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that release-dismissal agreements
are inherently odious and against public policy, and that courts should have no role in
promoting or enforcing diem). Contra Bushnell v. Rosetti, 750 F.2d 298, 301-02 (4th Cir.
1984) (holding that a release of civil rights claims in exchange for criminal sentencing
considerations should be enforced if the criminal defendant made a voluntary, deliberate,
and infOrmed decision to release the civil rights claims); Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201,
1203-04 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding, after noting that the court could find no cases on point,
that the release of a civil rights claim should be governed by a voluntariness standard bor-
rowed from maritime law).
92
 394 F.2d at 969.
93
 425 F.2d at 375-76 (discussing Mom. Com:  Or P BOP' L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A)
(1980), which prohibited a lawyer from presenting, participating in presenting, or threat-
ening to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter).
94 See 480 U.S. at 392-94. A few jurisdictions impose more demanding ethical stan-
dards than the Model Code provisions, so one could argue that Rumery's ethical approval
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release-dismissal agreement is enforceable if the defendant entered
into it voluntarily and intelligently, and that the public interest in en-
forcing the agreement outweighs the public policy that would be
harmed by enforcement. 95 The majority opinion explained both its re-
jection of a per se rule against enforcing release-dismissal agreements
and its adoption of additional safeguards by noting that release-
dismissal agreements are similar - to, but distinguishable from, plea bar-
gains.96 Both involve a defendant's difficult but not unconstitutionally
coercive choice to waive important rights in exchange for favorable
criminal treatment. 97 But, the Rumery majority reasoned, plea bargains
of release-dismissal agreements should carry less force in those jurisdictions. See CAL. RULE
OF PROF'', CONDUCT 5-100 (1992) (prohibiting a lawyer from threatening criminal, admin-
istrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain advantage in a civil suit); ME. BAR RULE 3.6(c)
(2005) (prohibiting a lawyer from presenting, or threatening to present, criminal, admin-
istrative, or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter). On the
other hand, in jurisdictions that have adopted the newer Model Rules of Professional Re-
sponsibility, the ethical question is probably moot. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof"!
Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992) (discussing threats of presenting criminal
charges in connection with a civil nuttier). 'Hie Model Rules have no specific counterpart
to the Model Code's 1)R 7-105(A). See id. In light of this omission, the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has opined that the Model
Rules give attorneys considerably greater freedom to make such threats than did the
Model Code. See id.
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392-94. Although the majority agreed on the basic voluntariness
standard, their fragmented opinions created some doubt about which party bears the bur-
den of proving a release-dismissal agreement's enforceability. See id. at 394-97 (Powell, j.,
concurring) (joined by Rehnquist, Cj., White, J., & Scalia, J.) (apparently implying that
the party seeking to rescind the agreement should bear the burden of prool); id. at 399-
401 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the party seeking to enforce the release-
dismissal agreement should bear the burden of proving its enforceability); id. at 417-20
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.) (arguing that
there should be a strong presumption against the enforceability of release-dismissal
agreements). The federal circuit courts interpreting Rumery on this burden of proof ques-
tion generally have held that the party seeking to enforce the agreement bears the burden
of proving that the agreement should be enforced. See Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing
Co., 338 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that the vote of Justice O'Connor, who
placed the burden of proof on the party seeking to enforce the agreement, was dispositive
in [turnery); Gonzalez v. Kokot, 314 F.3d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the party
seeking to enforce the agreement bears the burden of establishing its validity); Hill v.
Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196, 199 (11th
Cir. 1993) (same); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (same);
Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); Lynch v. Alhambra, 880 F.2d
1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that, as to the public interest prong, the party seeking
to enforce the agreement bears the burden of establishing its validity). But see Woods v.
Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 499-502 (8th Cir. 1993) (failing to specify which party should hear
the burden of proof).
96
 Renter), 480 U.S. at 393-94.
97/d.
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differ from release-dismissal agreements because a pica is conducted
under judicial oversight, brings immediate and tangible benefits to the
public (in particular, the rapid imposition of punishment while saving
prosecutorial resources), ensures some satisfaction of the public's in-
terest in the prosecution of crime, and indicates through the plea col-
loquy that the prosecutor's charges have some basis in fact. 98 Release-
dismissal agreements often do not share these attributes, 99
Moreover, Justice O'Connor and the four dissenters agreed that
the way in which release-dismissal agreements intermingle criminal
justice and non-criminal justice considerations gives rise to serious
concerns that should lead the courts to treat release-dismissal agree-
ments differently from normal plea bargains.ilm According to Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion, a release-dismissal agreement
differs from a plea bargain because a release-dismissal agreement ex-
plicitly trades the public criminal justice interest in convicting law-
breakers against the private financial interests of public officials in
avoiding civil liability; in contrast, a prosecutor striking a valid plea
bargain may consider only legitimate criminal justice concerns, such
as the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the defendant's
prospects for rehabilitation, and the defendant's degree of coopera-
tion with the authorities. 191 When, as happens in release-dismissal
agreements, the outcome of a criminal proceeding turns on extrane-
ous considerations unrelated to criminal justice objectives, the public
may lose faith in both the legitimacy of the bargaining process and
the fairness of those who administer the criminal process. 192
Along similar lines, Justice Stevens and the three other dissenters
argued that a release-dismissal agreement differs from a plea bargain
because the delicate balance of mutual advantage that results from
98 Id. at 393 n.3.
93 Id. On the other hand, the plurality opined, release-dismissal agreements may serve
the public interest in particular cases because such agreements can prevent public officials
from wasting government time defending themselves against unjustified civil rights claims.
Id. at 395-96 (plurality opinion). While emphasizing that the party seeking enforcement
should bear the burden of showing that such an interest exists, Justice O'Connor agreed
that this interest exists in some cases and further noted that a prosecutor's judgment to
spare the community the expense of litigation arising from minor crimes also could serve
the public interest. Id. at 399-400 (O'Connor, j., concurring).
10° See id. at 400-01 (O'Connor, j., concurring); id. at 410-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,580—
81 (2d Cir. 1949) (articulating the public interest in ensuring that lawsuits do not prevent
executive officials from exercising their dunes).
102 Rumery, 480 U.S. at 400 (O'Connor, j., concurring).
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plea bargains does not exist in release-dismissal agreements. 103 In plea
bargaining, the negotiation is a give-and-take over the nature of the
defendant's wrongdoing; in a release-dismissal agreement, the nego-
tiation is aimed at resolving a civil rights claim against public officials
that is unrelated to the nature of the defendant's wrongdoing.m Al-
though the outcome of a criminal proceeding may affect the value of
the civil claim, the two claims being negotiated in a release-dismissal
agreement are quite distinct as a matter of law. 1 °5 Thus, the release-
dismissal agreement exacts a price from the defendant unrelated to
the character of his or her wrongdoing.m Justice Stevens also ex-
pressed concern that in negotiating the agreement, serious public
policy and ethical issues arise from the prosecutor's representation of
multiple and conflicting interests. 107 In Rumery, then, five justices agreed
that the different public policy concerns and different balance of mu-
tual advantage that flow from release-dismissal agreements, as com-
pared to those of normal plea bargains, justify imposing a heavier
burden on the party seeking to enforce these agreements. 1 D8
11. PLEA BARGAINING IN THE ENEMY COMBATANT CONTEXT
A. The Post-9/11 Innovation of Enemy Combatant Detention
On September 11, 2001, the Al Qaeda terrorist organization at-
tacked the United States by hijacking commercial airplanes and delib-
erately crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York City
and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. 1 °9 The attacks killed almost 3000
people—the largest loss of life the United States has ever suffered on its
1 °3 Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
l" Id.
Ir15 Id.
Id. at 411.
1 °7 ilumery, 480 U.S. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 °8 See id. at 400411 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 410-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
As mentioned above, the Court in Rumeq did not clearly slate which party bears the IMP.
dell of proving a release-dismissal agreement's enforceability, but lower courts have gener-
ally placed the burden on the party seeking to enforce the agreement. See supra note 95.
105 See, e.g., N.R. Kleinfielcl, A Creeping Horror: Buildings Burn and Fall as Onlookers Search
for Elusive Safety, N.Y. TimES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al; Serge Schmemaitn, President Vows to Exact
Punishment for 'Evil,' N.Y. Timm, Sept. 12, 2001, at. Al. For a description of how Al Qaeda
carried out the attacks, see NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OP THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 1-14 (2004), available at Intp://www.gpoaccess.gov/
911/pclf/fullreport.pdf thereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
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soil as a result of hostile attack)'° In response, Congress passed an
Authorization for Use of Military Force resolution (the "AUMF"),
which stated in relevant part:
[1] he President is authorized to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.'"
Thus began what President George W.-Bush calls the "War on Terror. "112
As part of the War on Terror, the President has claimed the
authority to designate individuals as enemy combatants and hold
them under military authority for as long as the President deems nec-
essary for national security." 3 The power to make such designations,
according to the executive branch, derives from the President's war
powers as Commander in Chief. 114
 The government asserts that de-
taining enemy combatants serves two military objectives: preventing
these individuals from rejoining enemy forces and enabling the mili-
tary to gather intelligence from the detainee." 5 Unlike prisoner-of-
war detentions in traditional wars, enemy combatant detentions in the
War on Terror raise troubling new questions, including how to iden-
tify the "enemy" and how to identify the end of the conflict." 6
110 9/ 1 1 COMMISSION REPoiru, supra note 109, at 311.
111 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2000 & Supp. III 2003)) [hereinafter AUMF1.
115
 President George W. Bush, Address to a joint Session of Congress and the Ameri-
can People (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.h tml) ("Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it dues
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated."). Although Bush Administration officials briefly re-branded this
campaign as the "Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism," President Bush has since
reverted to the more forceful-sounding "War on Terror." Eric Schmitt & Thom.Shanker,
New Name for 'War on Terror' Reflects Wider U.S. Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A7;
Richard W. Stevenson, President Afahes It Clear: The Phrase Is 'War on Terror,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug,
4, 2005, at Al2.
113 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 16.
114 Id. at 13; see also U.S. CONS -r. art. 11, § 2 ('The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.").
115 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 15; Brief for the Petitioners, supra note
3, at 28-29.
116 See Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519-21 (2004) (recognizing that the uncon-
ventional nature of the War on Terror could lead to perpetual detentions of enemy com-
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When faced with legal challenges to enemy combatant detentions,
the government has argued that the President should have essentially
unfettered authority to capture and imprison anyone indefinitely—
whether citizen or non-citizen, captured on U.S. soil or abroad—at the
sole discretion of the President as Commander in Chief. 117 In 2004, the
Supreme Court simultaneously issued three cases—Rasul v. Bush, Ilatruli
v. Rumsfeld, and Rumsfek/ v. Padilla—that gave the Court an opportunity
to define the scope of the President's authority to detain enemy com-
batants in the War on Terror. 118 These three cases provide the only ex-
isting judicial guidance on the potential limits of this novel authority. 119
In the first of the 2004 enemy combatant cases, Rasul v. Bush, the
Supreme Court held that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
the habeas corpus petitions of various foreign nationals captured
abroad and detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. 12° The Court did not, however, reach the merits of the detain-
ees' claims. 121
batants, but holding that the Court did not yet lace that satiation in the case at bar); In re
,Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,474-78 (D.D.C. 2005) (criticizing the
expansive definition of "enemy combatant" adopted by the government, which permits the
detention of individuals based solely on their contacts with terrorists rather than on their
involvement in actual terrorist activities); COLE, Minn note 5, at 40-41 (describing the War
on Terror as being directed against a potentially infinite range of enemies and having no
discernible endpoint).
117 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 25-27; Brief for the Petitioners, supra
note 3, at 38; see also Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 E. Stipp. 2d at 475 (noting that in re-
sponse to the hypotheticals posed by the court, the government asserted that its authority
to detain individuals as enemy combatants extended to a little old lady in Switzerland who
writes checks to what she believes is a charity but is actually an Al Qaeda front, a person
who teaches English to the son of an Al Qaeda member, and a journalist who knows the
location of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden but refuses to disclose it in order to protect
a confidential source).
118 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-33 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,483-84 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla (Padilla 1), 542 U.S. 426,451 (2004).
119 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-33; Rasul, 542 U.S. at. 483-84; Padilla I, 542 U.S. at 451.
Although prior cases involving the detention and trial of "unlawful combatants"—that is,
enemy agents whom the President punishes for violating the law of war—speak to the
source of the President's power to detain combatants, they define the contours of the
President's power only as to punitive detentions, nut as to the preventive, non-punitive
detentions of the War on Terror. See generally in re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945) (upholding
the military trial and punishment of a Japanese general for permitting his troops to com-
mit atrocities); Ex Porte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding the military trial and pun-
ishment of German agents who entered the United States to commit sabotage).
120
 542 U.S. at 483-84.
121 See id. at 485. Since Rawl, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a challenge to the
fairness of the military tribunals taking place in Guantanamo Bay. See generally liannian v.
Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. eanted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005). About two months
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hamdan, however, Congress passed and
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In the second 2004 enemy combatant case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court outlined the due process guarantees for U.S. citizens
captured as enemy combatants abroad.' 22 The executive branch des-
ignated Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen who resided in Af-
ghanistan during the U.S. invasion, an enemy combatant after taking
him into custody in Afghanistan)" The executive branch based this
designation on two factors: Hamdi's presence in Afghanistan after the
U.S. invasion and the belief that Hamdi joined or assisted forces hos-
tile to the United States or its coalition partners in Afghanistan) 24
Without reaching the government's argument that the President
can detain enemy combatants under his plenary authority as Com-
mander in Chief, the Supreme Court held that Congress authorized
Hamdi's enemy combatant detention through the AUMF.' 25 Having
established the President's authority to detain Hamdi, the Court then
described the process owed to an enemy combatant under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 126 Applying the Mathews v. El-
dridge balancing test, the Court held that a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his or her classification as an enemy combatant must receive
President Bush signed into law the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which strips all U.S.
courts of jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay.
See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2740-
41 (to he codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)). Soon afterward, the government moved to dis-
miss Hamdan's petition fir certiorari, arguing that the Act's jurisdiction-stripping provi-
sions should divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in Hamdan's pending case. Respon-
dent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Harridan, No. 05-184 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2006).
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on March 28, 2006. See generally Transcript of
Oral Argument, Hamdan, No. 05-184 (U.S. March 28, 2006), available at http://wwwsu-
premecourtus.govionkarguments/argument_transcripts/05-184.pdf. Note that Hamdan,
a case involving foreign nationals captured by U.S. military forces abroad, is not the same
case as the similarly named !Jamie, which involves a U.S. citizen captured by U.S. military
forces abroad. See generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507; Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33.
122 542 U.S. at 509.
1" Id. at 510. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan tinder the authority of the AUMF. Id.; see
AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(2000 & Stipp. III 2003)). During the U.S. invasion, Afghan military forces allied with the
United States captured Hamdi, detained him, and turned hint over to U.S. troops. Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 510. After the U.S. government gained custody of Hamdi, officials first de-
tained and interrogated him in Afghanistan, and again in Guantanamo Bay, until they
learned that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen. Id. At that point, the U.S. government transferred
Hatradi to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia. Id. As a result of his designation as an enemy
combatant, Hamdi spent several months in U.S. military custody—held incommunicado,
without being charged with any crime, and without access to counsel—before his father
was able to file a habeas corpus petition on his behalf. Id. at 510-11.
121 Id. at 522 n.1, 526.
125 Id. at 517; see AUMF § 2, 115 Stat, at 224.
125
 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524-25.
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notice of the factual basis for that classification and a fair opportunity
to rebut the government's factual assertions before a "neutral deci-
sionmaker."127 The Court qualified its holding, however, by providing
some examples of the limited process due a citizen accused of being an
enemy combatant: a special military tribunal could count as a "neutral
decisionmaker," hearsay could be admissible in such a hearing, and the
detainee could bear the burden of proof to rebut the government's
factual assertions) 28 Significantly, these due process rights do not attach
upon the President's designation of the person as an enemy combat-
ant, nor upon that person's initial capture and detention as an enemy
combatant)" Instead, the Court held that the process described above
is triggered by the enemy combatant's challenge of his or her
classification as part of a post-deprivation hearing reviewing whether con-
tinued detention is necessary)"
In the third 2004 enemy combatant case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla (Pa-
dilla 1), the Supreme Court had an opportunity to define the due pro-
cess guarantees for U.S. citizens who are arrested and designated en-
emy combatants within the United States, but it declined to rule on
the issue)" Jose Padilla was a U.S. citizen whom federal authorities
arrested on a material witness warrant at the Chicago O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport, held as a material witness in New York, and then des-
ignated an enemy combatant before he had a meaningful opportunity
127 Id. at 535; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews test
weighs the private interest that will be affected by the official action against the govern-
ment's interest (including the nature of the interest at stake and the burdens on the gov-
ernment of additional process), considering both the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
that interest and the likely value of additional or snbstitute procedural safeguards.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
lsa Hamli, 542 U.S. at 533-34, 538. By contrast, a criminal defendant—whether ar-
rested in peace or wartime—has the right to a trial by a jury of his or her peers in which a
full panoply of evidentiary protections apply, and the government roust prove the defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to a speedy and public trial before an
impartial jury); In re Winship, 397 . 1.1.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (holding that under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no person may he convicted of a crime
except by proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324
(1946) (holding that because neither wartime conditions nor the declaration of martial
law entitles military tribunals to supplant entirely the criminal courts within the United
States, the defendants therefore were entitled to a criminal trial in a civilian court rather
than in a military tribunal),
129 Harnde, 542 U.S. at 534, 537-38.
1511 See id. at 534.
151 542 U.S. at 430.
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to challenge his extended detention as a material witness."2 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the President had
no authority to hold Padilla as an enemy combatant." 3 Without . ad-
dressing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit, holding that the New York court where Padilla filed his
petition lacked jurisdiction to hear his habeas corpus petition.' 4
After the Supreme Court's decision, Padilla renewed his litigation,
this time conforming to the Court's jurisdictional requirements. 135 In
Padilla v. Hwy? (Padilla II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit relied on Hamdi to hold that the AUMF authorized Padilla's
detention—even though he was a U.S. citizen and the government nei-
ther arrested him nor designated him an enemy combatant until after
he had returned to U.S. soil. 1 S6
 The court reasoned that Padilla posed
1" Id. at 430-32. Authorities arrested Padilla when he arrived in Chicago on an inter-
national flight from Pakistan and then kept him in custody as a material witness for over a
month. Id. at 430-31. Shortly before a scheduled hearing on Padilla's motion to vacate the
material witness warrant, the President designated Padilla an enemy combatant, and De-
fense Department officials shipped Padilla to a naval brig in South Carolina. Id. at 431-32.
155
 Padilla v. Rurnsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the President's
powers as Commander in Chief do not include the power to detain a U.S. citizen seized
within the United States as an enemy combatant and that President Bush's detention of
Padilla contravened the expressed will of Congress), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
134
 Padilla I, 542 U.S. at 451. The majority held that because the government success-
fully moved Padilla from New York to South Carolina two days before his lawyer filed a
habeas corpus petition on his behalf, the New York court never obtained jurisdiction over
Padilla. Id. at 441. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dis-
sented, arguing that the Court should have heard Padilla's habeas petition on the merits
both because of the case's profound and disturbing implications for liberty, and because
the government made the change in jurisdiction a fait accompli without providing fair no-
tice to Padilla's attorney. See id. at 455-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued
that the government provided inadequate notice by vacating the material witness warrant
in an ex parte proceeding that took place on a Sunday, immediately transferring Padilla to
the military facility in South Carolina, and then failing to inform Padilla's attorney
officially of her client's whereabouts until after she filed the habeas petition. See id.
"5 See Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla v. Haat, No. 05-533 (U.S. Oct.
25, 2005), available at 2005 WL 2822914 (appealing Padilla II ); infra note 139 and accom-
panying text. As a practical matter, Padilla fs restrictive jurisdictional requirements mean
that U.S. citizen enemy combatants cannot tile their habeas petitions in any jurisdiction
other than the Fourth Circuit, because the government has chosen to hold U.S. citizen
enemy combatants exclusively within that circuit's territorial jurisdiction. See Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 510 (describing how upon learning of flamdi's U.S. citizenship, the government
transferred Hanidi first from Guantanamo Bay to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, and
then to another naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina); Padilla 1, 542 U.S. at 432 (de-
scribing how upon transferring Padilla into military custody, the,government held Padilla
at the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina).
135 423 F.3d 38(1, 390-91, 393 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-533, 2006 WL 845383
(U.S. Apr. 3, 2006); see AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 229 (2001) (codified
at 50 § 1541 note (2000 &Supp. Ill 2003)),
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the same danger to U.S. interests in Chicago as he had while abroad, so
the government had the same power to designate him an enemy com-
batant in either circbmstance. 137, After Padilla filed a petition for certio-
rari appealing the Fourth Circuit's ruling, the Justice Department un-
sealed a criminal indictment against Padilla in the Southern District of
Florida, alleging offenses that were unrelated to and less serious than
the alleged acts the government had used to justify his detention as an
enemy combatant. 138 Following an unusual series of procedural devel-
opments, the Supreme Court authorized his transfer into civilian cus-
tody and then, after some delay, denied certiorari.'"
137 Padilla II, 423 F.3d at 393. According to the Fourth Circuit, Padilla associated with
anti-U.S. forces in Afghanistan and armed himself there in much the same way that Hanuli
did, rendering him a threat similar to Hamdi. Id. at 391-92; see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13.
Thus, the court reasoned, Padilla qualified as an enemy combatant for the same reasons as
Hamdi. Padilla II, 423 F.3d at 392; see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n. I. And because detaining
Padilla prevented his return to the battlefield, the court held that the AUMF authorized
Padilla's detention incident to the conduct of war, without specifically stating whether the
war its question was the war in Afghanistan or the larger War on Terror. See Padilla II, 423
F.3d at 392; see also AUMF § 2, 115 Stat. at 224. The court characterized the Hamdi plural-
ity's reasoning as rendering the locus of capture irrelevant, even though the Hamdi plural-
ity had repeatedly stated that Hamdi's capture while in a foreign combat zone was a sig-
nificant fact. Padilla II, 423 F.3d at 393-94; see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523-24. The court
justified this result by characterizing the fact. of foreign battlefield capture as merely being
part of the context of the Hamdi case rather than an essential part of its reasoning. Padilla
II, 423 F.3d at 393.
' 58
 Cf. Transcript of the Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding the Transfer of Ab-
dullah al Muhajir (Born Jose Padilla) to the Department of Defense as an Enemy Combatant
( June 10, 2002), reprinted in Joint App. at 60-62, Padilla I, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osgibriefs/2003/3mer/2mer/2003-1027.merja.pdf (alleg-
ing that Padilla was an Al Qaeda operative who was involved in planning a radiological "dirty
bomb" attack on civilians in the U.S.). See generally Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.wiggin.
com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/11-17-05%201ndictment.pdf  (alleging that Padilla played a minor
role in a terror support cell that sent money and recruits overseas).
1" See Halal v. Padilla (Padilla IV), 126 S. Ct. 978, 978 (2006) (mem.) (granting the
application for transfer into civilian custody). In refusing authorization for the transfer,
the Fourth Circuit—in an unusual display of pique—stated that the government's actions
created the impression that they were intentionally using the indictment to moot Padilla's
habeas petition and thereby evade Supreme Court review. Padilla v. Hanft (Padilla MO ,
432 F.3d 582, 585-86 (4th Cir. 2005), application granted by 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006). Stating
that the government's actions harmed the government's credibility before the courts and
created the impression that Padilla's long detention was a mistake, the court held that the
rule of law would best be served by maintaining the status quo and keeping the case live
fur consideration by the Supreme Court. Id. at 587. On January 4, 2006, the Supreme
Court granted authorization for Padilla's transfer and indicated that the Court would con-
sider Padilla's petition for certiorari. Padilla IV, 126 S. Ct. at 978. Three months later, a
divided Court denied certiorari, with Justice Kennedy issuing a concurring opinion and
Justice Ginsburg issuing a dissenting opinion. See Padilla v. Haat (Padilla V), No. 05-533,
2006 WL 845383 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2006); id. at *2 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing any
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B. Interaction of Enemy Combatant Detention with the Criminal justice System
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has set very few limits on
the President's power to designate people as enemy combatants."°
Even in cases involving U.S. citizen enemy combatants, the. Court has
given the President wide latitude to arrest and hold individuals under
military authority, without accusing them of any particular wrongful
acts, and to keep them in custody until the War on Terror ends."'
And in a growing number of cases, the government has arrested al-
leged terrorists under civilian authority and then detained them as
enemy combatants, or vice versa." 2
This flow between civilian prosecution and military detention is
possible because the Supreme Court has accepted the government's
argument that the purpose of enemy combatant detention is to pre-
vent fighters from taking up arms on the battlefield, not to punish
them. 143
 Thus, criminal prosecution and enemy combatant detention
serve different objectives and are—at least in theory—unrelated to
one another."' The non-punitive purpose.of enemy combatant deten-
consideration of Padilla's rights as an enemy combatant as "hypothetical" and unneces-
sary); id at *2 (Ginsburg, J.. dissenting) (arguing that Padilla's case is not moot and the
Court should have decided whether the President has authority to hold Padilla as an en-
emy combatant).
140 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34, 538; Rand, 542 U.S. at 485; Padilla 1,542 U.S. at 451.
141 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34, 538. David Cole characterizes such detentions as ef-
fectively life sentences, asserting that society will almost certainly cure both cancer and the
common cold before it can stop terrorism. COLE, supra note 5, at 41. At least one federal
judge shares Cole's concerns. See Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 335 F. Stipp. 2d at 465 (noting
that because the government has conceded that the War on Terror could last for several
generations, detention as an enemy combatant may well amount to a life sentence).
142 See infra notes 146-179 and accompanying text.
143 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (describing enemy combatant detention as a means of pre-
venting detainees front returning to the battlefield and taking up arms, not as a form of
punishment or vengeance).
144 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (holding that indefinite post-
sentence civil commitment of sexually dangerous predators is not punishment because its
purpose is not linked to any punitive purpose of retribution or deterrence, and therefore
it does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against punishing a defen-
dant twice for the same offense) (discussing the Double Jeopardy Clause of U.S. CONST.
amend. V, which reads, "[NJ or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb"). Yet as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in liamdi,
the grounds for designating Hamdi and Padilla as enemy combatants overlapped
significantly with the grounds for prosecuting a citizen for treason. Hamill, 542 U.S. at 559-
61 (Scalia, j., dissenting). Moreover, scholars have argued that, by allowing prosecutors to
target allegedly dangerous individuals for their associations rather than more substantial
acts, broad federal anti-terrorism laws have shifted criminal enforcement toward a more
prevention-focused paradigm. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support
Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HAttv. J. ON LEG1S. 1, 47-75 (2005) (arguing that the
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tion also suggests that a criminal defendant could be designated an
enemy combatant before a scheduled trial, after the jury announces
its verdict, or even during the trial. 145
The 2003 case of Al-Marri u Bush provides one example of a per-
son originally arrested by civilian law enforcement, but then desig-
nated an enemy combatant and transferred into military custody. 146 In
December 2001, federal agents arrested Ali &deli Kahlah al-Marri,
first holding him as a material witness and then charging him with
lying to the FBI and various forms of financial fratic1. 147 About a week
before his pretrial conference, and less than a month before his
scheduled trial date, the Justice Department dropped the criminal
charges against al-Marri, and the Defense Department designated him
an enemy combatant. I"
material support of terrorism laWs are an appropriate but imperfect means of prosecuting
terrorists before evidence of a conspiracy exists); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeat-
ing History in the War on Terror, 38 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (2003) (criticizing the
material support of terrorism laws as preventive law enforcement measures that make it
too easy for the government to prosecute assertedly suspicious individuals, even when
there is no evidence that the person ever participated in or planned a terrorist crime), The
apparent clash between present law enforcement practices and traditional theories of ret-
ribution and deterrence, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
145 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (holding that indefinite post-sentence civil commit-
ment of sexually dangerous predators is not punishment, and therefore does not implicate
the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against punishing a defendant twice !Or the
same offense); infra notes 146-179 and accompanying text. Before the trial of September
II co-conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui, the White 1-louse did consider dismissing the
charges against hint and declaring hint an enemy combatant, but officials ultimately de-
cided to let his case remain in the criminal justice system. Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt,
White House Weighs Letting Military Tribunal Try Moussaoui, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2002, at 17.
146 274 F. Stipp. 2d 1003, 1004 (C.D. III. 2003), alp, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 809 (2004); Schmidt, supra note 16, at AI.
147 Al-Mani, 274 F. Stipp. 2d at 1004. The apparently non-terrorism-related criminal
charges against al-Marri are an example of the Justice Department's so-called "Al Capone"
strategy of pretextual prosecution—charging terrorism defendants with lesser offenses to
disrupt alleged but unproven terrorist plots. See, e.g., Cou, supra note 5, at 203-04 (argu-
ing that pretextual law enforcement is potentially useful but needs to be subject to strin-
gent judicial review to deter improper prosecutorial motives, such as racial or religions
bias); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Sttintz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Comm, L. REv. 583, 618-24 (2005) (characterizing
pretextual prosecutions as a necessary tool in the War on Terror even though they can
carry a high societal cost).
Al-Marri, 274 F. Stipp. 2d at 1004. Al-Marri's attorney, Lawrence Lustberg, told re-
porters that the designation was an end-run around the legal system. Schmidt, supra note
16, at Al. As quoted by the Washington Post, Lustberg believed the Administration desig-
nated al-Marri an enemy combatant beCause al-Marri was raising "powerful legal chal-
lenges" to the government's allegations, and the government had no proof he was in-
volved in terrorism. Id.
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Another case, United States v. Lindh, began with military detention
and ended with a guilty plea in a civilian court. 149
 John Walker Lindh
was a U.S. citizen—a young white man from Marin County, Califor-
nia—who traveled to Afghanistan in the spring of 2001. 15° Once there,
he joined the Taliban regime then governing the country and ob-
tained military training at a camp run by Al Qaeda leader Osama bin
Laden. 151
 In November 2001, during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan,
Lindh and his fighting group surrendered to Afghan troops allied with
the United States in its fight against the Taliban. 152
 The Central Intel-
ligence Agency (the "CIA") briefly held and interrogated Lindh but
eventually turned him over to the Justice Department. 153 The Justice
Department then charged him with a variety of criminal offenses, in-
cluding providing material support to various terrorist organizations
and conspiring to murder U.S. nationals.'" On July 15, 2002, Lindh
pled guilty to providing support to the Taliban and carrying an explo-
sive during the commission of a felony, and the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to twenty years' impris-
onment. 155
 Interestingly, Lindh's plea agreement included a promise
by the government not to designate him an enemy combatant based
on the conduct alleged in the indictment. 156
One need not scrutinize the terms of plea agreements, however,
to see that federal prosecutors have used the revolving door between
civilian and military custody to their advantage.'" At least two success-
ful terrorism prosecutions—United States v. Fans and the "Lackawanna
149 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002).
159 Id. at 567-68.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 569.
153 Id. Some observers have argued that the President's choice not to designate Lindh an
enemy combatant was influenced by Lindh's race and socioeconomic class. See Miles Harvey,
The Bad Guy: Gangbanger, Fifth Columnist, Radical Muslim, Poor Fatherless Puerto Rican—Is It Mere
Coincidence that in Jose Padilla the Government Has the Perfect Fall Guy?, MOTIIER JONES, Mar–Apr.
2003, at 35 (noting that the most obvious difference between John Walker Lindh and enemy
combatant Jose Padilla is that Lindh is well-connected and white, while Padilla is poor and
Puerto Rican), available at hup://motherjones.com/commentary/notebook/2003/03/
ma_293_01.html. As Padilla's mother put it, "That John Walker Lindh. They didn't make him
disappear, take away his rights ... 1 guess maybe because his father's a lawyer. 1-1e's white,
whatever." Deborah Sontag, Terror Suspect's Path from Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004,
§ 1, at 1.
154
 Lindh, 227 F. Stipp. 2d at 566 n.2.
155 Id. at 566, 572.
156 See Plea Agreement If 21, Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (No. 02-37A), available at
http://files.findlaw.coni/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf.
157 See infra notes 159-179 and accompanying text.
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Six" case—appear to have involved direct threats to detain the defen-
dant as an enemy combatant. 158 In the Faris case, the FBI sought for
questioning lyman Faris, a thirty-four-year-old truck driver and U.S.
citizen who had immigrated to Columbus, Ohio from Kashmir. 159 Af-
ter he agreed to cooperate on March 20, 2003, the agents interro-
gated Faris in a hotel room in Ohio for several days. 160 With Faris's
consent, the FBI then transported him to Quantico, Virginia. 161 Ac-
cording to Faris, the FBI subjected him to daily interrogations from 9
a.m. to 5 p.m. with a break for lunch, posted guards outside his living
quarters, and permitted him to take only a one-hour escorted walk
outside each night. 162
Although Faris alleges that he repeatedly requested an attorncy,
the FBI continued interrogating him without counsel until early April
2003, when he refused to answer any questions without a lawyer pres-
ent. 163 On April 6, FBI agents allowed Faris to meet with his newly ap-
pointed attorney for the first thne. 164 On April 16, Faris's attorney told
him that if he did not accept the prosecutor's plea offer, the FBI
might send Faris to Guantanamo Bay. 165 On April 17, according to
Faris, an FBI agent visited him in his room and told Faris, outside the
presence of his counsel, that his time to accept the plea offer was end-
ing and that unless Faris pled guilty he might be sent to Guantanamo
Bay. 166 The same day, according to Faris, Faris's attorney telephoned
158 See infra notes 159-179 and accompanying text.
159 Faris Oct. 28, 2003 Hearing Transcript, supra note 12, at 17-18; see United States v.
Faris, 388 F.3d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 2004) (denying Faris's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 544 U.S. 916 (2005) (mem.), affd on remand,
162 F. App'x 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (per curiam); see also Lichtblau, supra note
11, atAl.
160 Faris Oct. 28, 2003 Hearing Transcript, supra note 12, at 18.
161 Id. at 18-19.
162 Declaration of lyman Faris in Support of Motion to Vacate Conviction Under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, at 3-4, Faris, No. 03-CR-189 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2006) thereinafter Declaration
of lyman Faris].
162 Id. at 2-3, 6.
11,4 Id. at 6. Faris's then-attorney indicated that the Fill agents introduced him to Faris.
Faris Oct. 28, 2003 Hearing Transcript, supra note 12, at 8.
165 Declaration of lyman Faris, supra note 162, at 18. During the hearing on Faris's mo-
tion to withdraw his guilty plea, Faris's attorney said he told Faris in mid-April that if he
did not accept the plea bargain, then "there's an agent, they're ready to take you back to at
least Columbus tonight and then perhaps Guantanamo Bay, to be decided later." Faris Oct.
28, 2003 Hearing Transcript, supra note 12, at 10. During that hearing, the prosecutor
denied threatening Faris with enemy combatant detention if he did not plead guilty, but
did note that the possibility of sending Faris to Guantanamo Bay came up in a discussion
with Faris's attorney while they were driving to Quart deo together. Id. at 17.
166 Declaration of Lyman Faris, supra note 162, at 18-19.
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United States.' 76 Despite the FBI's internal doubts about whether the
men were truly as dangerous as some analysts believed, the Justice
Department pushed hard on the case. 176 Then-U.S. Attorney Michael
Battle told the Washington Post that his office never explicitly threat-
ened to invoke enemy combatant status during plea negotiations, but
that the defendants and their attorneys knew the Defense Department
"had a hammer and an interest" and was standing ready to designate
the defendants as enemy combatants.'" Patrick J. Brown, who repre-
sented one of the six accused, told the Post that he and his fellow de-
fense attorneys advised their clients to plead guilty because of worries
that the government would respond to any defense victories in the
criminal case by declaring the defendants enemy combatants. 178 All
six men pled guilty to providing material support to terrorists, accept-
ing prison terms of six-and-one-half to nine years. 179
One observer has argued that this revolving door between the
criminal justice system and enemy combatant detention strongly sug-
gests that the government will use the method that is most convenient
to capture a person in the first place, and then will freely turn to an-
other form of detention on an ad hoc basis, depending on what is
most advantageous for the government's° If that argument is true—
or even appears to be true—then someone accused of terrorism-
related crimes could reasonably believe that if he fails to cooperate
with the government by pleading guilty, he is likely to be designated
an enemy combatant's' Perhaps it should not be surprising, then,
1 " Id.
178 See Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Where the Trail Led: Between Evidence and Sus-
picion; Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna "Terror Case, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 12, 2003, § 1, at 1
(discussing the case in detail, including one FBI agent's assessment that he did not see the
defendant he interviewed as being a potential suicide bomber, but merely "an all-
American kid who loves so much what he has in America and, fur some reason, somehow
he got involved in this").
177
	 supra note 174, at Al. Battle later became the Director of the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of justice, Attor'ney General Gonzales
to Appoint Michael A. Battle Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (Apr. 15,
2004), available at http://www.usdoigov/opa/pr/2005/Apri1/05_ag_197.111m.
08 Powell, supru note 174, at Al.
170 Id.
180 See Radack, supra note 6, at 541. According to Jcsselyn Radack, who coined the "re-
volving door" metaphor, moving terrorism defendants back and forth between the crimi-
nal justice system and enemy combatant detention is a particularly noxious variety of fo-
rum-shopping that makes enemy combatant detentions appear to be situational detentions
of convenience rather than detentions on the merits and undermines the legitimacy of
both the criminal justice system and the military system. Id.
181 See id.
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that in the eleven terrorism prosecutions the Justice Department has
cited as major successes in its annual reports between 2002 and 2004,
all but two of the cases terminated with most or all of the defendants
choosing to plead guilty. 182
III. ANALYSIS: ENEMY COMBATANT THREAT BARGAINS SHOULD
BE PER SE UNENFORCEABLE
Is a prosecutor's threat, during plea negotiations, to detain the
defendant as an enemy combatant akin to the permissible threats of
imposing heavier sentences or bringing new indictments against the
defendant? 183 If so, then any terrorism defendant who seeks to invali-
date an enemy combatant threat bargain must show that fear of en-
emy combatant detention so tightly gripped the defendant that, even
with the assistance of counsel, the defendant could not make a ra-
tional decision. 184
The threat of enemy combatant detention is, however, sui generic,
and should not be treated like normal plea bargaining tactics for two
major reasons. 185 First, enemy combatant threat bargains do not arise
from the normal give-and-take of plea bargaining because the choice
between a plea bargain and extrajudicial enemy combatant deten-
tion—with its limited due process guarantees, unusual severity, and un-
relatedness to criminal justice objectives—creates extraordinary pres-
sure to plead guilty to a degree unlike that presented by normal plea
bargaining threats. 186 Second, enemy combatant threat bargains create
serious public policy concerns and serve few societal interests because
152 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL. REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 19-20 (2004), available at
http://wwwtjustice.gov/usao/readilig_room/reports/asr2004/asr2004.pdf;  ExECuTivE OF-
FICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T or jusTicE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STA
TISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 20-22 (2003), available at littp://www.usdoigov/
usao/reading_room/reports/asr2003/03 STAT_Report.ptlf; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S.
ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL RE-
PORT, FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 20-23 (2002), available at Intp://www.usdoigov/usao/read-
ing_room/reports/asr2002/02_stat_book.pdf; see also CTR. ON LAW Sc SEC., N.Y. UNIV. Sot.
OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIALS: A REPORT CARD 8-12 (2005), http://www.law.nymedu/centers/
lawsecurity/publications/terrorisurialreportcard.pdf (listing the names of defendants, types
of charges, and outcomes for major terrorism cases since September 11, 2001).
155 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1977); Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790, 795 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
Ma See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
155 See infra notes 186-255 and accompanying text.
156 See infra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
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they lack the mutuality of benefits that characterizes normal plea bar-
gains, substantially increase the chance that innocent defendants will
plead guilty, serve no societal interests that could not be served equally
well by other means, and threaten both the integrity of the criminal
justice system and the rule of law.' 87 Thus, the most appropriate judicial
response is to hold enemy combatant threat bargains per se unenforce-
able under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 88
A. Enemy Combatant Threat Bargains Distinguished from the Normal Give-
and-Take of Plea Bargaining
In a normal plea bargaining situation, the prosecutor tries to con-
vince the defendant to plead guilty by emphasizing the consequences
of a guilty verdict for the crime charged or by threatening to seek a new
indictment against the defendant. 189 In both such situations, the alter-
native to accepting the plea bargain is going to trial.m If the defendant
is guilty, then the two choices the prosecutor offers to the defendant—
the bargain or the trial—both directly serve criminal justice objectives,
because both seek to punish and reform the defendant based on his or
her past bad acts. 191 This is the backdrop against which the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided to enforce the plea bargains in Brady v. United
States and its progeny. 192 In contrast, when a prosecutor tries to con-
vince a defendant to plead guilty by threatening the defendant with
enemy combatant status, the prosecutor is not comparing the conse-
quences of a plea bargain to those of a criminal jury trial; rather, the
157
	 infra notes 217-255 and accompanying text.
168 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974) (holding that a prosecutor's re-
indictment of a defendant on felony charges in response to the defendant's appeal of a
misdemeanor conviction imposed unconstitutional pressure discouraging defendants from
appealing); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583-85 (1968) (holding a death-by : jury,
life-by-plea penalty statute unconstitutional because its very structure penalized defendants
for exercising their Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial); infra notes 256-282.
189 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
00 See, e.g., Hayes, 434 U.S. at 365; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
19 ' See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 400-01 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
]f, on the other hand, the defendant is not guilty, then the trial is likely to serve the impor-
tant criminal justice objective of exonerating the innocent. See Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing the U.S. Attorney's obligation both to prevent the guilty
from escaping and to refrain from making the innocent suffer).
192 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at
768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
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consequences of a plea bargain are weighed against those of the extra-
judicial black hole of enemy combatant detention.'"
For three reasons, the threat of enemy combatant detention cre-
ates extraordinary pressure to plead guilty that is unlike the pressures
of any traditional plea bargaining tactic. 194 First, the process due to a
defendant in enemy combatant detention is uniquely unlike that due
to a defendant in a criminal tria1. 195 Second, the consequences of be-
ing designated an enemy combatant are unusually severe. 196 Third, the
threat of enemy combatant detention imports an extra element into
plea negotiations that is unrelated to criminal justice objectives. 197
Consequently, the policy reasoning and basic assumptions that under-
lie Bordenkircher v. Hayes, Brady, and other typical plea bargaining cases
should not apply to enemy combatant threat bargains.'"
First, the process due to a detainee in enemy combatant deten-
tion is uniquely unlike that due to a defendant in a criminal trial.' 99 In
a criminal trial, the government must prove the defendant guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 2" In enemy combatant detention, by con-
trast, the detainee becomes an enemy combatant as soon as the Presi-
dent designates the person as such, and the detainee bears the burden
of disproving the government's factual allegations in any subsequent
legal challenge.201 In a criminal trial, the defendant has the right to be
tried before a jury of his or her peers in a civilian court. 202 But in en-
emy combatant detention, the detainee's challenge may take place in
193 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,533-35 (2004) (describing the extremely lim-
ited process that is due to an enemy combatant).
" See infra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
WO See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
IS° See infra notes 206-209 and accompanying text.
197 See infra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
198 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at
768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
199 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-35.
200 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) (holding that under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, no person may be convicted of a crime except by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt).
201 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
2°2 See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,319-24 (1946) (holding that because nei-
ther wartime conditions nor the declaration of martial law entitles military tribunals to
supplant entirely the criminal courts, civilian defendants accused of crimes are entitled to
a criminal trial in a civilian court rather than in a military tribunal); Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2,119-24 (1866) (holding that a military commission, in a state that is not in rebel-
lion and where the courts are open and unobstructed, has no jurisdiction to try a defen-
dant and that the use of such a tribunal violated the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights by denying him a jury trial in a civilian court).
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a military tribunal." In a criminal trial, the government may not
prove its case by introducing hearsay arid evidence that poses too great
a risk of unfair prejudice." In enemy combatant detention, however,
the government may use hearsay against the detainee and generally
may dispense with other evidentiary procedures that the government
finds overly burdensome."
In addition, the consequences of being designated an enemy
combatant arc unusually severe." As the result of a guilty plea or guilty
verdict at trial, the criminal defendant receives a definite sentence, and
the defendant's treatment is limited by the Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 2°7 As the result of being
designated an enemy combatant, the detainee faces many of the same
harms as a convict (for example, imprisonment and damage to reputa-
tion), but additionally faces an indefinite period of confinement, and
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment might not impose any limitations on the conditions of
confinement." Because enemy combatant detention involves a poten-
tially lifelong confinement of uncertain length, in unusually restrictive
2o3 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
204 See, e.g., Fan. R. Evil). 403 (making evidence inadmissible if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); FEn. R. Evan. 802 (making
hearsay inadmissible); Crawlbrd v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54-68 (2004) (holding that
the Confrontation Clause bars prosecutors from introducing the testimonial statements of
any witness who does not appear at trial, unless the witness is unavailable and the defen-
dant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
205 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34.
206 See FED. R. Cim.i. P. 32 (describing the sentencing procedure in federal courts).
207 See U.S. CoNs.r. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); Fan. R.
CkIM. P. 32. (describing federal sentencing procedures).
208 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133 (1992) (reserving the issue of whether the
Eighth Amendment imposes any limits on the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs to a pretrial prisoner, as opposed to a convicted prisoner); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 664-71 (1977) (declining to extend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment to encompass schoolhouse discipline because the Eighth
Amendment historically applied only to post-conviction punishment of criminals); In or
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Stipp. 2d 443, 465-66 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that for
enemy combatants, the uncertain and potentially lifelong nature of their confinement may
make enemy combatant detention an even worse deprivation of liberty than being tried,
convicted, and sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment); Ctr. fur Nat'l Sec. Studies v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Stipp. 2d 94, 105 (D.D.C. 2002) (acknowledging the govern-
ment's contention that persons detained in connection with the September 11 attacks lace
embarrassment, humiliation, risk of retaliation, harassment, and physical harm due to
having their names connected to the attacks), affd in part and rev'd in part, 331 F.3(.1 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
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conditions, it is more extreme than a life sentence imposed after a
criminal trial and convictior039
Lastly, the threat of enemy combatant detention is unrelated to
criminal justice objectives. 210 In normal plea bargains, both possible
outcomes—the prosecutor's offers and the threatened trial—serve an
important criminal justice objective of punishing guilty defendants'
past bad acts (or, in the case of innocent defendants, allowing them
the opportunity to exonerate themselves).211 In contrast, the two pur-
poses of enemy combatant detention arc to facilitate interrogation
and to prevent the detainee from returning to the battlefield. 212 En-
emy combatant detention is preventive, not punitive, detention, and
thus it is unrelated to the criminal justice objective of punishing
criminals for past acts. 215
As a result of these differences, introducing the threat of enemy
combatant detention into plea bargaining disrupts the normal give-
and-take of plea bargaining. 214 Hayes, Brady, and their progeny all
dealt with situations in which the threats formed part of that normal
give-and-take. 215 Their reasoning should not apply to the enemy com-
batant threat scenario because the threat of enemy combatant deten-
tion—with its limited due process guarantees, stark differences from a
criminal trial, and unrelatedness to criminal justice objectives—is a
world apart from the traditional threats identified in Hayes, Brady, and
other typical plea bargaining cases.216
B. Public Policy Concerns and the Failure to Serve Societal Interests
In general, the Supreme Court places a high value on preserving
the finality of plea bargains, reasoning that refusing to enforce plea
bargains arising from the threat of new indictments, inaccurate legal
advice, fear of the death penalty, or coerced confessions would en-
" See Guantanamo Detainee Gases, 355 F. Stipp. 2d at 465-66.
21° Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
211 See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 400-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 410 (Stevens,,.,
dissenting).
212 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 15; Brief for the Petitioners, supra note
3, at 28-29.
213 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518
214 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at
768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
213 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at
768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
214 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at
768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
2006]	 Plea Bargaining Under the Threat of Enemy Combatant Detention 	 617
danger the viability of all plea bargaining. 217 The mutual benefits that
plea bargaining normally creates for both parties create a strong pub-
lic policy reason to preserve their finality. 215 Town of Newton v. Rumery
teaches, however, that when a particular kind of plea bargain gives
rise to unusual and serious public policy concerns, such as in release-
dismissal agreements, the courts may judge its enforceability by a dif-
ferent standard. 219 Enemy combatant threat bargains raise unusual
and serious public policy concerns—indeed, concerns markedly more
serious than those the Court addressed in I?umery, 22° Thus, the severe
consequences of enforcing enemy combatant threat bargains out-
weigh the limited extent to which they serve the general public policy
reasons for preserving plea bargains. 221
First, enemy combatant threat bargains lack the mutuality of in-
terests that characterizes normal plea bargains. 222 Compared with a
trial, a plea bargain allows the government to save scarce judicial re-
sources and secure a prompt punishment. 223 The defendant, mean-
while, benefits by limiting his or her potential sentence and avoiding
the burdens of a trial. 224 But when a plea bargain is compared to the
extrajudicial black hole of enemy combatant detention, the balance
of interests is very different from both the government's perspective
and the defendant's perspective. 225
From the government's perspective, an enemy combatant threat
bargain serves the government's interests no better than enemy com-
batant detention.226 Regardless of whether the defendant accepts the
bargain or chooses to be detained as an enemy combatant, the gov-
217 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at
768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
211 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752-53. As the result of a plea bargain, the state saves scarce
judicial resources and obtains prompt punishment, and the defendant limits his exposure
and avoids the burdens of a trial. Id, at 752.
219 See 480 U.S. at 393-94; id. at 400-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 408-11
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
229 See id. at 393-94 (majority opinion); id. at 400-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
408-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,261 (1971) (describing the benefits that.
plea bargaining provides to society as a whole); Brady, 397 U.S. at 752-53 (describing the
mutuality of benefits that legitimates plea bargaining).
222 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752-53.
223 Id.
224 Id.
223 See infra notes 226-236 and accompanying text.
226 See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
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ernment expends few judicial resources, achieves a prompt resolu-
tion, and successfully imprisons the defendant.227
From the defendant's perspective, however, introducing the
threat of enemy combatant detention throws the traditional balance
of interests out the window and makes pleading guilty the only ra-
tional choice.228
 If the defendant rejects the plea bargain and is des-
ignated an enemy combatant, there is no burden of proof for the de-
fendant to waive. 229
 There is no right against self-incrimination to
waive.230
 There is no jury trial to waive. 231 There is no right of con-
frontation to waive.232
 Thus, the government offers the defendant a
choice only in that the defendant may choose between waiving these
rights himself, or watching the government take these rights away. 233
From the defendant's perspective, this perverts the plea negotiations
into the old children's trick, "heads I win, tails you lose."2M Indeed, a
222 Compare Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32 (describing the government interests that the
Court has sought to accommodate in determining the due process standards for enemy
combatant detention), with Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (describing the government interests
in plea bargaining). Also, if the defendant has committed only minor crimes or no crimes
at all, then the bargain may actually work against the government's interest in imposing a
punishment proportional to the defendant's wrongdoing. See U.S. DEP'T or JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: TITLE 9, CRIMINAL DIVISION § 9-27.4008 (2002) (in-
structing federal prosecutors that plea bargaining should honestly reflect the totality and
seriousness of the defendant's conduct), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usatn/title9/27Incrm.htm#9-27.400; see also Berger, 295 U.S. at 88
(emphasizing that the U.S. Attorney's interest in a criminal prosecution is not merely to
win convictions, but also to serve the broader goals of justice); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.02(2) (c) (1962) (describing one of the goals of the Model Penal Code as seeking to
avoid excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary punishments).
225 See infra notes 229-236 and accompanying text.
229 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (holding that when a person challenges his or her
classification as an enemy combatant, the person may bear the burden of proving his or
her innocence).
23° See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769-70 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating that
where police shot a suspect multiple times, arrested him, and then coercively interrogated
him in the ambulance and the emergency room, the state did not violate his Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination because none of the compelled statements were used
against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding). Because enemy combatant detention is
not a form of punishment and does not terminate in a criminal proceeding, one could argue
that Chavez u Martinez would govern the applicability of the Filth Amendment to enemy
combatant detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518; Martinez, 538 U.S. at 769-70.
251 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (holding that when a person challenges his or her classi-
fication as all enemy combatant, a military tribunal is a permissible venue).
232 See id, at 535-34, 538 (holding that when a person challenges his or her classifica-
tion as an enemy combatant, hearsay and aflid avit evidence are permissible).
235
 See id. at 518, 534, 538; Martinez, 538 U.S. at 769-70.
254 See E. COBHAM BREWER, DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE (Bankby.00F11 online
ed., 2000) (1898) , http://www.bartleby.com/81/8064.1and.
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defendant who refuses to 'plead guilty loses several significant rights
that a convicted felon retains, such as a sentence of definite length,
freedom from cruel and unusual treatment, and the right to visits
from attorneys.235 This illusory choice makes the Fifth, Sixth, and Sev-
enth Amendments mere hollow promises, and it eliminates the mutu-
ality of interests that has traditionally legitimated plea bargaining. 236
Second, applying Brady standards to enemy combatant threat bar-
gains would legitimize these extraordinarily coercive circumstances and
thereby substantially increase the likelihood that innocent defendants
will choose to plead guilty. 237 The choice between pleading guilty and
being designated an enemy combatant leaves no opportunity for the
defendant to force the government to make its proof; rather, the de-
fendant merely has a choice between two kinds of detention. 2" Given
this choice, only the hardiest (or foolhardiest) of defendants would
reject the plea bargain and opt to be designated an enemy combat-
ant. 2" The very structure of the arrangement is so coercive that it in-
vites perjury in the form of false guilty pleas. 24° In other contexts,
"5 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-71; Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66
(noting that for enemy combatants, the uncertain and potentially lifelong nature of their
confinement may make enemy combatant detention an even worse deprivation of liberty
than being tried, convicted, and sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment); Declaration
of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby ( Jan. 9, 2003), reprinted in Joint App. at 86, Padilla I, 542
U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), available at http://www.usdoigov/osg/briefs/2003/3mer/
2mer/2003-1027.merja.ptif (arguing that any visits to Padilla by friends, family, and especially
legal counsel would harm national security by interrupting the interrogation process).
256 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123-24 (opining that allowing military justice to sup-
plant the common law courts would make democracy a failure and put an end to liberty).
2" See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (noting that the Court might have reached a different re-
sult had the tactic in question substantially increased the likelihood that defendants would
falsely plead guilty).
258 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (holding that when a person challenges his or her
classification as an enemy combatant, the person may bear the burden of proving his or
her innocence).
25D See Perry, 417 U.5. at 28 (emphasizing that if the prosecutor can easily use new in-
dicirnents to "up[] the ante" whenever a defendant appeals, then only the hardiest of de-
fendants will choose to exercise his or her right to appeal).
240 See United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527,1531-33 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane,
with an equally divided court) (reversing the defendant's conviction because a prosecution
witness's plea agreement promised the witness a favorable sentencing recommendation
contingent upon the results of his testimony); United States v. Dailey, 589 F. Supp. 561,
564-65 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that a plea agreement that made a witness's sentencing
recommendation contingent upon the successful prosecution violated due process), rey'd,
759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that the court below misread the language of the
agreement and that the agreement did not make the sentencing recommendation contin-
gent upon the government's successfid use of the proffered testimony).
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courts have refused to countenance plea agreements that invite per-
jury; the courts should do so in this context as wel1.241
Third, enforcing enemy combatant threat bargains serves no le-
gitimate governmental interest that could not be served equally well
merely by designating those who deserve to be enemy combatants as
enemy combatants in the first place.242 As described above, both en-
emy combatant detention and plea bargains lead to limited expendi-
ture of judicial resources, prompt resolution, and imprisonment of
the defendant. 245 From the government's perspective, the only benefit
that a defendant's guilty plea has over enemy combatant detention is
that the widespread use of enemy combatant detention would be po-
litically untenable, whereas frequent criminal convictions of suspected
terrorists are likely to be popular. 244 Popularity, however, is not the
kind of interest that a court should weigh in the government's fa-
vo r.245
Finally, court enforcement of enemy combatant threat bargains
undermines the rule of law and wrongly rewards the President for
clothing military detention in civilian trappings. 246 As the Supreme
241 See Waterman, 732 F.2d at 1531-33; Dailey, 589 F. Supp. at 564-65. As justice Suther-
land famously stated in Bergrr a United States, a federal prosecutor's interest in a criminal
prosecution is not merely to win convictions, but to do justice. See 295 U.S. at 88. Though
the prosecutor "may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." Id.
242 See I lamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32 (describing the government interests that the Court
has sought to accommodate in determining due process standards for enemy combatant
detention); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (describing the government interests in plea bar-
gaining).
245
 See I lamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
244 See CoLE, supra note 5, at 46 (noting that enemy combatant detention has received
far more criticism than many other anti-terrorism measures that threaten civil liberties);
President George W. Bush, President Discusses Patriot Act (June 9, 2005) (transcript avail-
able at hup://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050609-2.1and)  (arguing
that the justice Department has made communities safer by filing criminal charges against
more than 400 terrorism suspects and convicting more than half of those charged).
245 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (holding that popular oppo-
sition to flag burning did not increase the government's interest in suppressing that form
of speech); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (holding that segregationists' threats of
mob violence did not justify denying black schoolchildren the right to attend integrated
schools); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942) ("The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.").
240
	
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the courts should riot carry out a military expedient that has no place in law
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Court recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, a plea bargain can become a
"perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality." 247 This is especially true when
the plea bargain covers up the quiet pressure that military authority
exerts on a criminal defendant. 248 Enemy combatant detention serves
very different objectives from imprisonment of criminals. 24° The for-
mer is a preventive detention for national security purposes, and the
latter punishes the defendant for his or her past violations of the
law.25° Such military authority is dangerous enough on its own, be-
cause military detention of civilians in lieu of criminal prosecution is
generally hostile to the Anglo-American legal tradition; its very
flexibility invites abuse of power. 251 But these dangers multiply when
courts let the wolf of wartime powers slip into the sheep's clothing of
the judicial system. 252 As Justice ,Robert Jackson wisely observed in his
dissent to the World War II internment case of Koremalsu v. United
States, the courts must exercise only the judicial power, applying law
and abiding by the Constitution, lest they lose their identity as civil
courts and become instruments of military policy.253 Whenever a
court enforces an enemy combatant threat bargain, the court turns
under the Constitution); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121 (holding that ,-a military tribunal
cannot derive its authority from the judicial power).
247 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243 (1969).
248 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 ( Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that when a military
commander does something unconstitutional, it is an incident, but when the courts ap-
prove of it, that incident becomes constitutional doctrine).
249 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (describing enemy combatant detention as a means of
preventing detainees from returning to the battlefield and taking up arms, not a Fortin of
punishment or vengeance); Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, supra note 235,
reprinted in Joint App. at 86 (describing the importance for national security of detaining
Padilla for interrogation purposes).
250 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
251 See id. at 559-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that, absent suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, the Founding Fathers never intended to grant the military the power to
detain citizens without trial); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S at 121-24 (holding that military
detention can never be applied to citizens in non-rebel states where the courts are open
and unobstructed, because civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot coexist); if.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220 (noting that in wartime circumstances of great peril, the gov-
ernment may take actions that are inconsistent with the United States' basic governmental
institutions); id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that the government may
take actions under the war power that would be condemned as lawless in other contexts).
252 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245-96 ( Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial ap-
proval of the internment of Japanese Americans struck a deeper blow to liberty than the
military internment order itself, because when a judicial opinion puts the imprimatur of
constitutionality on a military order, the court has validated the principle for all time, leav-
ing it lying about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need").
255 Id. at 247.
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plea bargaining—and therefore the courts themselves—into an in-
strument of military policy. 254 Such intermingling of military and ju-
dicial roles threatens the integrity of the criminal justice system and
poses grave threats to the rule of 1aw. 255
C. The Need for Per Se Unenforceability
Enemy combatant threat bargains do not arise from the normal
give-and-take of plea bargaining, they create serious public policy
concerns, and they serve few, if any, societal interests. 256 Thus, the
standards for enforcement of normal plea bargains should not apply
to enemy combatant threat bargains. 257 Rumery's tougher standards
for enforcing release-dismissal agreements also fail to protect ade-
quately the defendant's right to due process of law. 258 Instead, it is
most appropriate to apply the reasoning of United States v. Jackson,
North Carolina v, Pearce, and Blackledge v. Perry to invalidate enemy com-
batant threat bargains.259
Rumery's release-dismissal standard—the defendant must have
entered into the agreement voluntarily and intelligently, and the pub-
lic interest in enforcing the agreement must outweigh the public pol-
icy harmed by enforcement—is not appropriate for the enemy com-
batant threat bargain context. 260 The Rumery standard relies upon a
careful, case-by-case factual inquiry into the public interest in enforc-
ing the agreement. 261 But under Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the government's
conclusory affidavits attesting to the defendant's dangerousness are
an adequate basis for designating the defendant an enemy combat-
254 See id.
255 See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 320-22 (describing the view of the Founding Fathers that
military power must not be permitted to interfere with civilian government, and particu-
larly the judiciary).
258 See supra notes 189-255 and accompanying text.
257 See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 400-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 410-13 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
258 See infra notes 260-265 and accompanying text. See generally Rumery, 480 U.S. 386.
255 See Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-29 (holding that the prosecutor's reindictment of the de-
fendant on felony charges in response to the defendant's appeal of a misdemeanor convic-
tion imposed unconstitutional pressure discouraging the defendant from appealing);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,723-24 (1969) (holding that a judge's imposition
of heavier sentences upon re-trial chilled defendants' exercise of the right to appeal); Jack-
son, 390 U.S. at 583-85 (holding the death-by-jury, life-by-plea structure of the statute un-
constitutional because it penalized defendants for exercising their Sixth Amendment right
to demand a jury trial).
26° See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
261 See id. at 392,397-98 (majority opinion).
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ant. 262 Thus, to evaluate the public interest in enforcing an enemy
combatant threat bargain, the court would have to rely solely on the
factual assertions in the government's conclusory affidavits, with no
way of probing those assertion An inquiry so starved of facts would
not satisfy Rumery's demand for case-by-case decision making, 264
Moreover, if history is any guide, a court's unquestioning reliance on
the government's uncorroborated factual assertions would very likely
lead to' injustice. 265
In addition, the government's primary interest in enforcing the
plea bargain—to prevent dangerous terrorists from carrying out at-
tacks by keeping them detained—is actually illusory. 266 If the threat of
enemy combatant designation is truly justified, then the government
could just as easily remove the defendant from the streets by designat-
ing the defendant an enemy combatant in the first place. 267 And if the
262 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
263 See id.; Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392, 397-98.
264 See. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 397-98 (endorsing a case-by-case approach for examining
the enforceability of release-dismissal agreements); N. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (describing the close examination of many factors that indicates whether or not a
release-dismissal agreement should be enforced).
265 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (upholding Korematsu's conviction for vio-
lating the race-based wartime exclusion orders); Hirabayashi v, United States, 320 U.S. 81,
102 (1943) (upholding Flirabayashi's conviction for violating the race-based wartime cur-
few orders). The most infamous illustration of the perils of such reliance comes from the
World War 11 Japanese American internment cases of Korematsu v. United States and Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, in which the Supreme Court relied on the factual conclusions of an
Army report to uphold race-based curfews and exclusion of Japanese Americans as neces-
sary military measures, See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-24; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100-05.
Nearly half a century after the internment program ended, historical researchers discov-
ered that the report was a knowing and deliberate misrepresentation; War Department
officials had doctored the report in order to assist with the internment litigation and then
suppressed evidence of their misrepresentation. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d
591, 593-99 (9th Cir. 1987) (evaluating Ilirabayashi's petition for a writ of error carom
nobis to set aside his conviction due to manifest injustice); Korematsu v. United States, 584
F. Supp. 1406, 1416-19 (N.1). Cal. 1984) (evaluating Korematsu's petition for a writ of
error roram nobis to set aside his conviction due to manifest injustice). In the mid-1980s,
lower courts acknowledged this injustice :by vacating the wartime criminal convictions of
two of the Japanese Americans who had violated the race-based military orders. See Hiraba-
yashi, 828 F.2d at 608 (vacating Hirabayashi's wartime conviction); Korematsu, 584 F. Supp.
at 1420 (vacating Korematsu's wartime conviction). More recent examples of such gov-
ernment prevarication also exist. See United States v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 2d 801, 807-17
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (vacating a former CIA official's criminal conviction for exporting explo-
sives to Libya because the government kn'owingly introduced a false affidavit by the execu-
tive director of the CIA that prejudiced his defense).
266 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
267 See id. Of course, numerous distinguished scholars and jurists have convincingly ar-
gued that threatening a U.S. citizen with enemy combatant detention is never justified ab-
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threat of enemy combatant designation is not justified, then the gov-
ernment has no legitimate interest in detaining the person other than
by normal criminal processes.268
The inability of the courts to conduct an in-depth analysis of the
public interest in enforcement, as well as the very serious liberty, due
process, and judicial integrity interests harmed by enforcement, coun-
sel for a per se rule against enforcement of enemy combatant threat
bargains.269 There is constitutional support for such a rule.2" Like the
statutory structure in Jackson, the judge's resentencing in Pearce, and
the prosecutor's reindictment in Perry, threats of enemy combatant
detention during plea bargaining violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment because they chill the exercise of a defendant's
right to a jury trial, deterring all but the hardiest defendants from re-
fusing the proffered plea bargain.27 ' In order to prevent these due
process violations from taking place, courts should refuse to enforce
enemy combatant threat bargains. 272
This per se rule does not interfere with the enforcement of nor-
mal plea bargains because the policy reasoning behind normal plea
bargaining decisions does not apply to enemy combatant threat bar-
gains. 2" First, the policy reasoning behind normal plea bargaining
decisions such as Brady and Hayes is inapplicable because enemy com-
batant threat bargains are so clearly distinguishable from the tradi-
tional give-and-take of plea bargaining. 274 Threats of enemy combat-
ant detention are more akin to the unconstitutional threats that the
Court condemned in Pearce and Perry.275 Second, enemy combatant
detention is itself unique. 276 Enemy combatant detention—a poten-
tially lifelong confinement of uncertain length, in unusually restrictive
sent an explicit congressional suspension of habeas corpus. See, e.g., id. at 554-79 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 1125-26. But their arguments have not yet
carried the day. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24 (holding that the AUMF authorizes the de-
tendon of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant).
268 See Padilla v. Hauft (Padilla III ), 432 F.3d 582,585-86 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing
the government's apparent ulterior motives for transferring Padilla between enemy com-
batant detention and the criminal justice system).
269 See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392,397-98.
279 See Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-29; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725
271 See Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-29; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725; Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583.
272 See Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-29; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
273 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,212-13 (1978); Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65;
Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at 768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
274 See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-97; Richardson, 397 U.S. at
768-70; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51.
275 See Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-29; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-24.
276 See Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66.
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conditions—is an unusually severe form of detention, more extreme
than a life sentence imposed after a trial and conviction, and it arises
from a process where confinement is a much more certain outcome
than that of any criminal trial.277
This rule of per se unenforceability should apply regardless of a
prosecutor's motivation for making the detention threat. 278 As the
Court stated in Perry, a defendant is entitled to pursue his or her con-
stitutional rights without fear of government retaliation, no matter
what the government's motivations. 279 This is particularly true where
the rights at stake arc as fundamental as those at stake here, and
where the criminal justice system will be harmed rather than helped
by widespread enforcement of enemy combatant threat bargains. 2"
Thus, because they arise from an environment that improperly chills
the defendant's exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
courts should hold enemy combatant threat bargains per se unen-
forceable as a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to
due process. 281
 In time, such a ruling would have the salutary effect of
constraining the influence of enemy combatant detention on the
criminal justice system, both by deterring prosecutors from offering
such bargains and by encouraging executive or legislative constraints
on the enemy combatant detention power. 282
277
	 id.
278 See Perry, 417 U.S. at 27-28.
272 See id. at 28-29.
280 See id.
281 See id. at 27-29; Pearee, 395 U.S. at 723-24; Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583-85.
282 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) (suggesting a particular warning to
safeguard defendants' rights during custodial interrogations but indicating that Congress
and the states are free to develop their own safeguards so long as they are equally effec-
tive). One possible legislative solution would be for Congress to make clear that it has not
authorized the enemy combatant power in any instance outside the context of battlefield
captures. See Ilamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (holding that the AUMF authorizes the detention of
Flamdi, who was captured on an Afghan battlefield, as a fundamental incident of war);
Padilla 1, 542 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J„ dissenting) (arguing that the AUMF dues not author-
ize the long-term incommunicado detention of U.S. citizens arrested in the United States).
Another, less dramatic solution would be to prohibit the Defense Department, through
legislation or an inter-agency agreement, from designating a person as an enemy combat-
ant after that person has been indicted pursuant to a federal terrorism investigation. See
Radack, supra note 6, at 542 (criticizing the absence of such restrictions). Even if the po-
litical branches failed to take action, however, courts sitting in equity could achieve a simi-
lar result by putting the government to an election of remedies: that is, fbrcing the gov-
ernment to choose between enemy combatant detention and criminal prosecution soon
after the defendant's arrest. See United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 294-99
(1922) (describing election of remedies as an equitable doctrine barring a party, after
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CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining is an important part of our judicial system. For two
major reasons, however, plea bargains induced by threats of enemy
combatant:detention should not be governed by normal plea bargain-
ing standards. First, enemy combatant threat bargains do not arise from
the normal give-and-take of plea bargaining, because the choice be-
tween a plea bargain and extrajudicial enemy combatant detention—
with its limited due process guarantees, stark differences from a crimi-
nal trial, and unrelatedness to criminal justice objectives—creates an
extraordinary pressure to plead guilty unlike that .of any normal . plea
bargaining tactic. Second, enemy combatant threat bargains create se-
rious public policy concerns and serve few societal interests, because
they lack the mutuality of benefits that characterizes normal plea bar-
gains, substantially increase the chance that innocent defendants will
plead guilty, serve no societal interests that could not be served equally
well by other means, and threaten both the integrity of the criminal
justice system and the rule of law. Because enemy combatant threat
bargains chill defendants' exercise of their Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial and do not deserve the deference courts normally afford
normal plea bargains, and because the limited factual basis required
for an enemy combatant designation will starve for facts any case-by-
case balancing of interests, the most appropriate judicial response is to
hold enemy combatant threat bargains per se unenforceable under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
CARL TAKE!
electing to pursue one remedy, from subsequently pursuing another inconsistent remedy
based on the same wrong).
